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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a white woman who works as a bartender in a popular casino in an
alternate racial universe. Your employer has issued and enforces the following grooming policy
as it relates to hairstyles:
POLICY
Employees will adhere to the following appearance guidelines within the workplace.
Failure to abide by these guidelines may result in disciplinary action, including
termination.
Appearance: Employees must maintain a professional image at all times.
Hair: Extreme or fad hairstyles are prohibited.
• Males:
Hair must be worn in a short style and must not extend below the top of your
shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited.
• Females:
Hair must be worn in braids of any kind, including cornrows,1 locks,2 twists,3 or a
short style that does not extend below the top of your shirt collar.

You file a lawsuit, alleging discrimination at the intersection of race and gender. You do not
contest the difference in hair length restrictions placed on male and female workers. Courts have
repeatedly applied the undue burden test—a special hybrid, disparate treatment-disparate impact
test used in sex-discrimination grooming cases—and upheld policies that allow women to wear
their hair long but require men to wear their hair short.4 These courts reason that such hairlength policies impose different but essentially equal burdens on men and women.5
1

Braids are a hairstyle that consists of sections of hair where three segments of each section are repeatedly twisted
over each other until their very ends. See Zondra Hughes, The Explosion of Braids, Locks, and Twists, EBONY, Sept.
2002, at 108 (discussing the variety of braided hairstyles used by professional black women). Cornrows are a type
of braided hairstyle where the hair is braided onto the scalp in rows, usually all the way down to the nape of the neck
and then hanging down from there. See Anita M. Samuels, Rediscovered Cornrows, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 30, 1995, § 1,
at 40. Cornrows are relatively inexpensive hairstyles. As one article stated, they can cost ―$10 to $35 a head at the
Nubian salon, $10 to $15 if a homegirl does it.‖ Id.
2
Locks consist of sections of hair that are ―permanently locked together and cannot be unlocked without cutting.‖
Shauntae Brown White, Releasing the Pursuit of Bouncin‟ and Behavin‟ Hair: Natural Hair as an Afrocentric
Feminist Aesthetic for Beauty, 1 INT‘L J. MEDIA & CULTURAL POL. 295, 296 n.3 (2005); see also Angela OnwuachiWillig, Undercover Other, 94 CAL. L. REV. 873, 873 n.3 (2006) (defining locks); Samuels, supra note 1, at 40
(defining locks as ―allowing the hair to mat‖). According to White, the term ―loc‖ or ―lock‖ is preferred to the term
―dreadlock,‖ as ―the term dreadful was used by English slave traders to refer to Africans‘ hair, which had probably
loc‘d naturally on its own during the Middle Passage.‖ White, supra, at 296 n.3.
3
Twists are a hairstyle similar to regular braids. However, braids consist of three segments of hair that are
repeatedly twisted over each other until their very ends, while twists are made by twisting two segments of hair over
each other repeatedly until their ends. See Hughes, supra note 1.
4
Although the undue burden test examines the effects of a policy on different groups and is, at times, referred to as a
disparate impact test, it is a means for determining disparate treatment, not disparate impact—at least as disparate
impact is traditionally understood. In order to assert a valid disparate treatment claim based upon a grooming or
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Instead, you challenge the policy as discriminatory at the intersection of race and gender.6
You could easily comply with the grooming code by just cutting your hair very short, but you
want to wear your hair long and down—a prerogative that has been routinely recognized for
women outside of the military context.7 You argue that you are uniquely and negatively affected
by the company‘s grooming policy in a way that white men are not because their required short
hairstyle matches the normative ideal for men in society. You further contend that the policy,
like many others, is discriminatory because it is founded upon a race-based preference for black
hair. You also explain that black women do not suffer the same harms because the costs of
wearing their hair in braids, locks, or twists are not as burdensome in terms of time or money;
after all, such styles are suited for black hair.8 You concede that you technically could wear your
dress code under Title VII, a plaintiff must make out a prima facie case establishing that the challenged employment
action was either intentionally discriminatory or that it had a discriminatory effect on the basis of a protected
category. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Jespersen v. Harrah‘s Operating Co., 444
F.3d 1104, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir.
1980). ―An appearance standard that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and women is not
disparate treatment.‖ Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000). Once a plaintiff establishes such
a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
action. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. In a grooming code case with different requirements for different groups, an
employer can justify its requirements only by showing that they are bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ).
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109 n.1 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). A BFOQ is a qualification that is reasonably
necessary to the normal operation or essence of an employer's business. See id.; see also ROBERT C. POST,
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 17–18 (2001). However, a
BFOQ cannot be used as a defense in cases involving racial discrimination. See 110 CONG. REC. 2550 (1964)
(expressly rejecting race as a BFOQ under Title VII).
5
See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm‘t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (asserting that, by
―longstanding‖ and ―binding precedent,‖ grooming policies that treat men and women differently are not viewed as
discriminatory); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that grooming
standards that approve different hair lengths for men and women do not violate Title VII); Baker v. Cal. Land Title
Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1974) (―We agree with the district court that a private employer may require male
employees to adhere to different modes of dress and grooming than those required of female employees and such
does not constitute an unfair employment practice within the meaning of [Title VII].‖); see also POST, supra note 4,
at 43–44; Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms,
and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2559–65 (1994) (noting that courts have held that the regulation of
appearance traits like ―beards‖ and ―bust size‖ is discrimination based upon the trait, rather than the sex that closely
correlates with that trait).
6
In her article, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw
introduced the concept of intersectionality, which explains how race and gender can interact to shape the multiple
dimensions of black women‘s experiences in the workplace. Crenshaw explained the way in which black women
may face unique forms of discrimination that differ from the discrimination faced by black men or white women; in
this sense, she proclaimed, black women may encounter discrimination in contexts where neither black men nor
white women would. Id.
7
See Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Tracy L. Dumas, The Hair Dilemma: Conform to Mainstream Expectations or
Emphasize Racial Identity, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL‘Y 407, 410 (2007) (noting the freedom afforded to most
white females outside of the military context to style their hair based on ―personal preferences‖).
8
There are a small percentage of black women whose hair texture and structure are like those of most white
women—naturally straight and thin. An overwhelming majority of black women, however, have tightly coiled hair
that grows into an Afro, not down, when grown long. See id. at 411 (―The natural hair texture of most Black women
is kinky, wooly, or tightly curled.‖). In this Essay, when I refer to ―black hair‖ or ―black women‘s hair,‖ I am
referring to the hair texture and structure that belongs to the vast majority of black women. Likewise, there are
white women who have ―curly‖ hair; it is important to note, however, that the hair texture and structure for nearly
all, if not all, of these women differ greatly from those of black women. For example, when grown long, the hair of
Page 3 of 47
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hair in braids, locks, or twists, but you explain that, compared to black hair, your hair is thin,
straight, and fine. As a result, wearing your hair in any of these styles would impose
burdensome costs from a monetary and psychological perspective and in terms of the time and
energy it would take to maintain such a hairstyle every day.
You think your case is a slam dunk and, in all likelihood, you would be correct in our actual
society.9 Many courts (and many people) in our society would find the notion of forcing white
women to abide by a grooming policy that does not acknowledge or recognize the structure and
texture of their hair ludicrous. Yet, antidiscrimination case law imposes just such a requirement
on black women by upholding implicit demands that they straighten their hair and then maintain
that hairstyle through various processes.10 This case law not only reinforces gender expectations
about hair length, but also is based upon an invisible white and gendered norm that presupposes
that black women can wear their hair straight and hanging down—in other words, fit within the
gendered ideal for women—without altering the physical structure of their hair11 or enduring
enormous burdens on their finances, health, and time.12

nearly all white women with curly hair grows down, even if puffy, and not up into an Afro. Additionally, even if an
Afro of sorts grows, the structure of these white women‘s hair generally is not tightly coiled and kinky. See infra
section II.A.
9
We are now leaving the alternate universe. On her blog ―Alienated Conclusions,‖ one black female writer
modeled a post after Gloria Steinem‘s essay ―If Men Could Menstruate‖ to write ―‗If‘ Black Women Were White
Women.‖ With regard to hair, she wrote in relevant part:
Straight blond hair would be considered ―wild and unruly‖ because when the wind blew, it did not
stay in place. Women with naturally straight hair would hide their ―unruly‖ and ―wild‖ stickstraight hair in public. The desire for ―lightweight hair‖ that defied gravity would permanently
end the use of blow dryers. Keeping one‘s natural blond hair wild and straight would become
indicative of a political statement.
Alienated Conclusions, http://nerdsevolving.blogspot.com/2009/08/what-black-women-were-white-women.html
(Aug. 23, 2009, 22:00 EST).
10
See, e.g., Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (upholding a policy that banned braided
hairstyles); see also Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Apr.
25, 2008); McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996);
see also Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J.
365 (describing how Cheryl Tatum, a black woman who wore her hair in a pageboy style of tiny braids, was fired
from her job as a restaurant cashier at the Hyatt because her style was determined to violate the employer‘s policy
against ―extreme and unusual hairstyles‖); Teressa Gubbins, The Debate: Uniformity vs. Diversity, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 29, 2002, at 1C (noting that Officer Gina Mosley was fired for refusing to cut her locks).
Grace Salvant, a college student, was initially denied the opportunity to return to her former job at Ruby Tuesday
because of her braids, even though the company had previously allowed women to wear braids at work. Salvant
explained that ―she wears braids 90 percent of the time because of the convenience and that she has never
chemically treated her hair.‖ Hazel Trice Edney, Howard Student Knocks Out Restaurant Hair Policy, DISTRICT
CHRON. (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 3, 2008, available at
http://media.www.districtchronicles.com/media/storage/paper263/news/2008/03/03/Cover/Howard.Student.Knocks.
Out.Restaurant.Hair.Policy-3247838.shtml (describing how protest led to a repeal of a no-braids policy, but noting
that the employer Ruby Tuesday maintains its policy against locks and describing the interaction of one employee
who was asked to remove her twists). Wendi Hathorn, another college student, complied with a request to remove
her twists before she was hired, but explained her reasons for desiring twists as a natural hairstyle: ―I wasn‘t happy
with having to take my hair out because my hair is natural and I didn‘t want to straighten it every day before I go to
work.‖ Id.
11
See Rosette & Dumas, supra note 7, at 410 (―[L]ong straight hair has generally been considered the gold standard
for attractiveness.‖); Rose Weitz, Women and Their Hair: Seeking Power Through Resistance and Accommodation,
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Consider, for example, the case Darlene Jespersen filed against Harrah‘s Casino in Reno,
Nevada.13 Jespersen was a twenty-plus-year veteran, white, female bartender at Harrah‘s,14
which had a dress code that read, in relevant part:
Beverage Bartenders and Barbacks will adhere to these additional guidelines:
Overall Guidelines (applied equally to male/female):
Appearance: Must maintain Personal Best image portrayed at time of hire.
Jewelry, if issued, must be worn. Otherwise, tasteful and simple jewelry is permitted; no
large chokers, chains or bracelets.
No faddish hairstyles or unnatural colors are permitted.
• Males:
Hair must not extend below top of shirt collar. Ponytails are prohibited.
Hands and fingernails must be clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times. No
colored polish is permitted.
Eye and facial makeup is not permitted. . . .
• Females:
Hair must be teased, curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be worn
down at all times, no exceptions.
Stockings are to be of nude or natural color consistent with employee‘s skin tone.
No runs.
Nail polish can be clear, white, pink or red color only. No exotic nail art or
length. . . .
Make up (face powder, blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in
15
complimentary colors. Lip color must be worn at all times.

15 GENDER & SOC‘Y 667, 672 (2001) (―[C]ertain ideas about attractiveness and female hair appear deeply and
widely embedded in American society. First, to be most feminine and hence most attractive, women‘s hair should
be long . . . .‖); White, supra note 2, at 297–98 (―While long hair, as Brownmiller argues, has been used as a
measure of femininity for white American women, African American women have been subjected to that same
measurement. In addition, the measurement of beauty and femininity is taken one step further in that an African
American woman‘s hair is more valued not only if it is long, but also if it is straight. . . . While American women
have been subjected to a standard of beauty the average woman might find difficult to attain, the African American
woman is doubly subjected in that the standards were not even created for her.‖); see also infra section II.A and Part
IV.
12
See infra section IV.B.
13
Jespersen v. Harrah‘s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
14
Id. at 1106–07.
15
Id. at 1107.
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Jespersen took issue only with the requirement to wear make-up and refused to comply,
which ultimately resulted in the end of her employment at Harrah‘s.16 Thereafter, Jespersen sued
her employer, arguing disparate treatment and disparate impact on the basis of sex under Title
VII.17 In deciding her claim, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, first applied the undue burden or
unequal burdens test. In grooming code cases under Title VII, a plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by establishing that the challenged employment action had a
discriminatory effect on the basis of a protected category;18 however, a grooming requirement
―that imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and women‖ is not considered to be
discriminatory.19 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that Jespersen had failed to prove sex
discrimination because Harrah‘s grooming code requirements, while different for men and
women, did not ―place[] a greater burden on one gender than the other.‖20
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit rejected Jespersen‘s disparate treatment claim on the ground
of sex stereotyping. Although the court noted that dress or grooming codes could result in an
intentional discrimination claim based on sex-stereotyping, it held that Harrah‘s policy did not
support a stereotyping claim because it was not ―adopted to make women bartenders conform to
a commonly-accepted stereotypical image of what women should wear‖ and because it did not
―objectively inhibit a woman‘s ability to do the job.‖21
Jespersen received significant, nationwide attention,22 and legal scholars have criticized its
holding and reasoning.23 No scholar, however, has analyzed the case at the intersection of race
and sex by asking: What if Jespersen had been a black woman? How would the focus of the case
and thus the ensuing analysis been different?
One possibility is that a black Jespersen may have also challenged Harrah‘s hair grooming
requirements for women. After all, what does it mean for black women when an employer
orders its female employees ―to wear [their] hair down at all times, no exceptions‖ and to have

16

Id. at 1108. Jespersen ―found the makeup requirement offensive, and felt so uncomfortable wearing makeup that
she found it interfered with her ability to perform as a bartender.‖ Id. Darlene Jespersen left her job, but the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that she was ―effectively terminated‖ for refusing to comply with Harrah‘s make-up
requirement. Id. at 1105, 1108.
17
Id. at 1108–09.
18
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Jespersen, 444 F.3d 1104; Harriss v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1980).
19
Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000).
20
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109.
21
Id. at 1112.
22
For example, in 2007, the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy hosted a symposium entitled ―Makeup, Identity
Performance & Discrimination‖ that focused almost entirely on Jespersen. See 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL‘Y 1–
560 (2007).
23
See, e.g., Dianne Avery, The Great American Makeover: The Sexing Up and Dumbing Down of Women‟s Work
After Jespersen v. Harrah‘s Operating Company, Inc., 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 299, 300–01 (2007) (critiquing the
Jespersen court‘s reading of Title VII and its likely impact on the ―commercialization of women‘s sexuality‖);
Devon W. Carbado, G. Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at Work, in
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105, 116–18, 132–48 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006) (arguing that
―Jespersen misunderstands the nature of contemporary sex discrimination‖); Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of
Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1057–58 (2009) (critiquing Jespersen in the context of gender subordination
and self-expression); Michael Selmi, The Many Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL‘Y 467,
468, 479–90 (2007) (discussing the implications of Jespersen for sexual stereotyping law and workplace identity);
see also Tristin K. Green, Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86
N.C. L. REV. 379, 396–400 (2008) (describing scholarship on ―workplace assimilation‖).
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their hair ―teased, curled, or styled every day‖?24 For most black women, wearing their hair
―down‖ would require that their hair be straightened, either by a hot comb25 or a chemical
relaxer26 (otherwise known as a ―permanent‖ or ―perm‖). Assuming that braids, locks, and twists
were prohibited, the same processes would be required to tease, curl, or style the hair of most
black women, as their natural hair is usually tightly coiled and grows into an Afro.
In sum, while the grooming requirements for Harrah‘s imposed significant burdens on
women of all races,27 they presented additional challenges for black women based on the
biological nature of black women‘s hair. This burden on black women would have been even
greater if those same requirements were read by supervisors to prohibit hairstyles such as braids,
locks, and twists.28 Even in our ―post-racial‖ society, where race has purportedly become
meaningless,29 significant phenotypical differences between Blacks and Whites30 are ignored in
ways that reify the subordinate status of black women in the workplace.
This Essay uncovers the invisible white and gendered norms about hair that I contend have
resulted in a misapplication of current antidiscrimination case law to hair grooming policies that
prohibit natural hairstyles31 for black women, such as braids, locks, and twists. First, this Essay

24

See Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
A hot comb is a metal comb that is heated on a stovetop and used to straighten hair. It is also known as a pressing
comb or straightening comb.
26
Relaxers are the chemicals used to straighten tightly coiled hair, usually of people of African descent. Madame
C.J. Walker created the first hair straightening process for black women. The first black-female, self-made
millionaire, she ―achieved her wealth through a hair straightening empire in the early twentieth century.‖ Monica
Bell, Comment, The Braiding Cases, Cultural Deference, and the Inadequate Protection of Black Women
Consumers, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 125, 133–34 (2007); see also Tracey Owens Patton, Hey Girl, Am I More
Than My Hair?: African American Women and Their Struggles with Beauty, Body Image, and Hair, NWSA J.,
Summer 2006, at 24, 29 (―In the twentieth century, the 1905 invention of Madame C.J. Walker‘s hair softener,
which accompanied a hair-straightening comb, was the rage.‖).
27
See Rhode, supra note 23, at 1057; see also Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
28
See infra Part IV. We do not know if Harrah‘s banned braids, locks, or twists on the ground that they were not
―professional‖ or were ―extreme‖ hairstyles. In a number of instances where employers have prohibited black
females from wearing natural hairstyles, however, the bans were not explicit. Instead, the employer codes simply
prohibited ―extreme,‖ ―unconventional,‖ or ―eye catching‖ hairstyles, and supervisors, with the backing of their
employers, identified black women‘s natural hairstyles as violations of their workplace policies. See, e.g., Hollins v.
Atl. Co., 188 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 1999) (reprimanding a black female employee for an ―eye catching‖ and ―too
different‖ hairstyle); Caldwell, supra note 10, at 367; see also Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256,
259 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (involving the claim of a black man whose dreadlocks were deemed ―unconventional‖).
29
See Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Policing Race in the Age of Obama, 97 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2009) (describing others‘ understanding of a ―post-racial‖ society as consisting of ―the seeming evaporation of race
as a basis for social ordering‖).
30
Throughout this Essay, the words ―Black‖ and ―White‖ are capitalized when used as nouns to describe a racialized
group; however, these terms are not capitalized when used as adjectives. Also, the term ―Blacks‖ is used instead of
the term ―African Americans‖ because the term ―Blacks‖ is more inclusive. See Why “Black” and Not “AfricanAmerican”?, J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC., Spring 2004, at 18, 18–19. Additionally, ―[i]t is more convenient to invoke
the terminological differentiation between black and white than say, between African-American and Northern
European-American, which would be necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two typologies.‖ Alex
M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1043, 1044 n.4.
31
Natural hair is ―[h]air that is not chemically altered or straightened by the pressing comb.‖ INGRID BANKS, HAIR
MATTERS: BEAUTY, POWER, AND BLACK WOMEN‘S CONSCIOUSNESS 172 (2000); accord White, supra note 2, at
295–96 n.2 (―Natural hair is hair that has not been altered by chemicals and can be tightly coiled (or kinky) as well
as straight.‖); see also Bell, supra note 26, at 132–33 (noting that natural hairstyles are also referred to as
25
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argues that antidiscrimination law fails to address intersectional race and gender discrimination32
against black women through hair-based grooming restrictions because it does not recognize
braided, twisted, and locked hairstyles as black-female equivalents of Afros, which are protected
as racial characteristics under existing law.33 The claim here is that, based on current rationales,
natural hairstyles for black women should already be protected under antidiscrimination law and
are currently excluded only because of courts‘ incomplete understanding of the nature of black
women‘s hair. If courts fully acknowledged the biological differences between black and white
hair, and examined these cases at the intersection of race and gender, they would understand
braids, locks, and twists to be the functional equivalents of Afros and would view these
hairstyles in the same light as other phenotypical and racial characteristics, such as skin color and
nose width. In today‘s society, black women can change their noses and skin tones, just as they
can change their hair, but the law would never uphold a restriction that implicitly required Blacks
to modify either their skin tone or nose width.
Additionally, this Essay argues that courts should extend the application of the special
―undue burden‖ test from gender discrimination cases to race discrimination cases and apply the
test intersectionally in hairstyle-related grooming code cases brought by black women.
Specifically, this Essay argues that antidiscrimination law fails to address such intersectional
race and gender discrimination against black women because it does not recognize the undue
burdens that such policies impose on black women to either hide or change a natural,
phenotypical characteristic.34 Overall, this Essay explains the dangers of implicit racial bias in
―traditional hairstyles‖). Natural hairstyles are those hairstyles that allow black women to keep their hair in its
natural structure and texture or allow black women to avoid further chemical and heat processing of their hair.
32
See supra note 6.
33
See Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 166–67 (7th Cir. 1976) (recognizing a valid Title
VII claim where plaintiff alleged that her employer fired her because of her Afro hairstyle); E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71244, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 18 (June 10, 1971) (finding that an employer‘s line of sight grooming policy
adversely affected black employees who naturally have a different hair texture than white employees); see also
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (asserting that a code that prohibits ―the ‗Afro/bush‘
style might offend Title VII‖).
Even the Afro, however, is not fully protected. Many employers allow only short Afros. See, e.g., Tania
Padgett, Ethnic Hairstyles in Corporate Life, NEWSDAY (Melville, N.Y.), Nov. 25, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
23314578 (quoting one business owner as saying ―that, outside of short-cropped Afros, most ethnic hairstyles are a
‗no-no‘ in his office‖). In other words, in some workplaces, black women are not allowed to grow their natural hair
beyond a prescribed length, while white women are allowed to grow their natural hair without limitation.
34
Although intuition and common sense suggest that black women suffer disparate effects from bans on natural
hairstyles such as braids, locks, and twists, I do not focus my analysis on the potential for a successful disparate
impact claim for several reasons. First, no black woman has ever filed (although a black man has) a traditional
disparate impact claim based upon natural hairstyle restrictions—one that accepts the grooming requirements as
facially neutral. Second, disparate impact theory is viewed as a weak tool for combating discrimination by
plaintiffs‘ attorneys. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2006) (arguing that the focus of disparate impact doctrine on ―discrete decision[s] (to hire, to
fire, to promote) . . . make[s] it a poor tool for addressing discrimination that does its work through an accumulation
of small, repeated instances of biased perception and evaluation‖); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and
Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 654–58 (2005) (explaining how the disparate impact theory ―falls short‖ in
―addressing work culture as a source of discrimination‖); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a
Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 738–53 (2006) (arguing that disparate impact theory has proven useful in only a
limited group of testing cases). But see Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace
Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 984–1000 (2005) (arguing for the revival of disparate impact theory as a
litigation tool). Third, part of my goal in addressing disparate treatment claims is to expose the invisible raced and
gendered norms behind employer appearance codes regarding hair—to expose the policies as lacking in neutrality.
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the workplace as demonstrated by raced and gendered norms in grooming codes that place a ban
on hairstyles such as braids, locks, and twists.
Part I of this Essay discusses the case Rogers v. American Airlines,35 the seminal case on
hair, grooming restrictions, and black women, which other courts cite pro forma in dismissing
similar claims of race and gender discrimination. Part I also highlights key points from Professor
Paulette Caldwell‘s analysis of Rogers in her article, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the
Intersection of Race and Gender.36
Part II explains why the Rogers court reached the wrong conclusion under that court‘s own
rationale. Specifically, it reveals how the court‘s application of its rationale was based on a
flawed understanding of black hair and an assumption of white characteristics for black women‘s

Disparate impact theory, however, applies where a policy is facially neutral. See Int‘l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 & n.15 (1977). Fourth, despite extensive searches, I have been unable to collect data
regarding the percentages of black women and white women who have tightly coiled hair as opposed to straight hair.
This lack of statistics regarding the hair types of black women and non-black women makes it difficult to address
disparate impact claims on a broader, more general level. For detailed analyses of disparate impact theory, see
Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory
of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 43 (2005); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003); Selmi, supra; Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98
GEO. L.J __ (2010); Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White
Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505 (2004).
Looking at specific workplace statistics, however, a black female plaintiff could prevail on a challenge to her
individual employer‘s restriction on braids, locks, and twists under a disparate impact analysis. An employer
violates Title VII under the disparate impact theory if it maintains a specific employment practice that, although
facially neutral, ―in fact fall[s] more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business
necessity.‖ Int‟l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971);
see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (holding that, to establish a Title VII
disparate impact claim, plaintiff must identify specific employment practice challenged and show statistically that
the practice has excluded ―applicants . . . because of their membership in a protected group‖), superseded in part by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (placing burdens of production and
persuasion on defendant to ―demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related . . . and consistent with business
necessity‖). ―Discriminatory intent need not be proven, the theory can apply to either objective or subjective
practices, and those practices can turn on either immutable characteristics or difficult to change characteristics,
regardless of whether or not reliance on those characteristics serves to perpetuate the effects of pre-Title VII
intentional discrimination.‖ Eatman v. United Parcel Serv., 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citations
omitted). In this sense, each disparate impact plaintiff in a natural-hairstyle grooming case would have to produce
evidence of (1) the relevant population of employees within the business who are affected by the policy (all black
women with extremely curly or tightly coiled hair, regardless of whether they actually straighten their hair or not)
and (2) the comparison group for all others in the relevant population, such as all non-black women, excluding AfroLatinas, who do not have tightly coiled hair. As I mentioned above, however, this information is difficult to obtain
because statistics are not collected regarding the hair types of black and white women, although intuition strongly
suggests that a very high percentage of black women belong in group one and a very high percentage of white
women belong in group two in any workplace. See infra section IV.C (briefly analyzing a potential disparate impact
claim).
35
527 F. Supp. 229; see also Caldwell, supra note 10 (critiquing Rogers); Paulette M. Caldwell, Intersectional Bias
and the Courts: The Story of Rogers v. American Airlines, in RACE LAW STORIES 571, 571–600 (Rachel F. Moran &
Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008) (same).
As Caldwell reveals in her chapter in Race Law Stories, this published case name actually misspells the
plaintiff‘s last name. The correct spelling is ―Rodgers.‖ Caldwell, supra, at 572 (citing Complaint, Class Action, at
1, Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (No. 81 Civ. 4474 (AS))). For the sake of
consistency, however, I use the spelling ―Rogers‖ throughout this Essay.
36
Caldwell, supra note 10.
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hair. Part II then describes the law regarding appearance regulations on hair and how the law has
shifted or not shifted since Rogers. In particular, this Part exposes the case law‘s implicit
(though admittedly essentialist) acknowledgement of race as a social construct, one that is
defined by many phenotypical factors, including not just skin color, but also hair.37
Part III examines how lawyers‘ past arguments for plaintiffs such as Rogers have failed to
capitalize on the biology of black women‘s hair in seeking protection from discrimination based
on employers‘ bans on hairstyles, such as braids, locks, and twists. Specifically, it analyzes
critiques regarding past arguments that focused solely on the cultural connections between hair
and race.
Part IV exposes antidiscrimination law‘s role in reaffirming racialized and gendered
appearance standards, with white women as the gender norm and black men as the race norm,
and explicates how these norms ignore the reality of black women‘s hair in its natural state and
thus discriminate against them based upon a racial characteristic. In particular, it reveals how
policies against braids, locks, and twists rest upon race-based preferences for white hair and
hairstyles—regardless of whether braids, locks, and twists are ―culturally‖ associated with black
women today or not.
More specifically, Part IV begins by providing lawyers with the tools for explaining how a
ban on natural hairstyles for black women leaves black women with far fewer choices in hair
grooming than white women. Essentially, due to the biological nature of black women‘s hair,
such policies currently leave black women with one of two choices if they wish to wear their hair
long and hanging down: either (1) straighten their hair with a chemical relaxer or hot comb or (2)
wear a weave or wig. Both choices require black women to either change the structure and
texture of their natural hair or cover it up. In essence, with the exception of a miniscule number
of white women whose hair structure and texture may bear a resemblance to those of black
women, black women whose employers ban natural hairstyles are left with only one option for
wearing their hair in its natural structure and texture: an Afro. Even that option is severely
restricted by many employers, who allow only short Afros. In this sense, many black women are
not allowed to wear their natural hair exactly as it grows out of their heads as lengthily as white
women are allowed to wear theirs.
Additionally, Part IV demonstrates the significant financial, temporal, health, and
psychological burdens placed on black women as a result of these two non-natural choices for
long hair that hangs down. In so doing, it highlights the evidence that supports a finding that
employers‘ prohibitions of braided, locked, and twisted hairstyles have a disparate effect or place
an undue burden on black women.
Finally, Part IV explicates how bans on natural hairstyles for black women are
discriminatory against black women under traditional disparate impact theory. Even if most

37

See Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 DUKE L.J. 1487, 1493 (2000) (―[G]ross
morphological differences (e.g., the broadness of the nose, the fullness of the lips, the curl of the hair) have and
continue to be used to delineate racial categories and to assign persons to racial groups.‖); see also id. at 1515–22
(discussing how skin color has ―played an important role within the Black community‖). Essentialism posits that
there is ―a unitary, ‗essential‘ . . . experience [that] can be isolated and described independently of [gender,] race,
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience‖ for any identity group, such as women. Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990); see also Emily M.S. Houh,
Toward Praxis, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 905, 924–28 (2005) (defining both intersectionality and anti-essentialism);
cf. Catherine Smith, Unconscious Bias and “Outsider” Interest Convergence, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1077, 1084–88
(2008) (exploring how unconscious biases contribute to ―racial identification,‖ arguably akin to essentialism).
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black women ultimately choose to straighten their hair, black women are significantly more
likely than white women to be affected by hair restrictions that ban braids, locks, or twists.
Part V then studies and analyzes the termination experience of Judge Mablean Ephriam,
formerly of Divorce Court, who was fired by Fox Network because of a dispute over ―hair.‖
Finally, this Essay concludes by detailing the importance of analyzing the social meaning behind
the repeated judicial validation of the invisible raced and gendered norms that underlie
employers‘ prohibitions of natural hairstyles for black women.
I. THE ORIGINAL HAIRPIECE
This . . . type of regulation has at most a negligible effect on employment opportunity.
—Rogers v. American Airlines38

Rogers v. American Airlines is the seminal case concerning employer grooming codes as
they relate to the intersection of race and gender. In Rogers, a black female employee of
American Airlines filed a discrimination lawsuit under Title VII, arguing that the airline
discriminated against her ―as a woman, and more specifically a black woman‖ through a
grooming policy that prohibited employees in certain roles from wearing all-braided hairstyles.39
An employee for eleven years, Rogers declared, ―[T]he ‗corn row‘ style [her hairstyle] has a
special significance for black women.‖40 She argued that the cornrow hairstyle ―has been,
historically, a fashion and style adopted by Black American women, reflective of [the] cultural,
historical essence of the Black women in American society.‖41 In response to Rogers‘s claim,
American Airlines filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit.42
The district court evaluated Rogers‘s claims of discrimination ―as a woman, and more
specifically, a black woman‖ through two separate analyses: one for sex and the other for race,
but not for both race and sex as her complaint indicated.43 First, the district court reviewed her
claim of gender discrimination, dismissing that claim on the ground that American Airlines‘s
restriction on braided hairstyles applied to both men and women.44 The court further reasoned
that the fact that women wear braided hairstyles far more often than men was inconsequential
because the policy did ―not regulate on the basis of any immutable characteristic of the
employees involved.‖45
Thereafter, the court examined Rogers‘s case as a pure race discrimination claim and
dismissed that claim as well.46 The court first highlighted the fact that the policy applied equally

38

Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231 (referring to the airline‘s prohibition on braided hairstyles).
Id.; see also Caldwell, supra note 35, at 575 (noting that ―American [Airlines‘s] grooming rules [were] for
customer-contact ground personnel‖).
40
Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.
41
Id. at 231–32 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42
Id. at 231.
43
Id. at 231–32.
44
Id. at 231.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 234.
39
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to members of all races.47 The court noted that Rogers ―first appeared at work in the all-braided
hairstyle . . . soon after the style had been popularized by a white actress [Bo Derek] in the film
‗10.‘‖48 Then, although conceding that a policy ―prohibiting the ‗Afro/bush‘ style might offend
Title VII,‖ the court reasoned that Rogers‘s lawsuit differed from one based on a ban of Afros
because an all-braided hairstyle ―is not the product of natural hair growth but of artifice.‖49 The
court contended that, unlike a braided hairstyle, an Afro hairstyle ―would implicate the policies
underlying the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics‖ because it
is a ―natural hairstyle.‖50 The court further asserted, ―An all-braided hairstyle is an ‗easily
changed characteristic,‘ and, even if socioculturally associated with a particular race or
nationality, is not an impermissible basis for distinctions in the application of employment
practices by an employer.‖51
Finally, the court explained that the airline did not require Rogers to change her hairstyle;
after all, she could have followed the airline‘s suggestion to ―pull her hair into a bun and wrap a
hairpiece around the bun during working hours.‖52 In response to Rogers‘s claim that the
hairpiece—not her real hair, but an artifice—had caused her to have severe headaches, the court
asserted that ―even if any hairpiece would cause such discomfort, the policy does not offend
substantial interest.‖53
In sum, the district court dismissed Rogers‘s discrimination claims based on American
Airlines‘s appearance policy on the following grounds: (1) the contested appearance provision
did ―not regulate on the basis of any immutable characteristic‖ and (2) the challenged policy
applied equally to both races and sexes.54 It never even addressed Rogers‘s intersectional race
and sex challenge to the airline‘s hair-related grooming restriction.55
In 1991, Professor Paulette Caldwell analyzed the Rogers case in her well-known article A
Hair Piece.56 Caldwell argued that Rogers‘s flaw was that it rested upon the premise that racism
and sexism, though similar in certain respects, existed and operated separately and independently
from each other.57 Because of this flaw, Caldwell explained, ―[t]he court refused to
acknowledge that American‘s policy need not affect all women or all blacks in order to affect
black women discriminatorily.‖58
Caldwell further highlighted what she saw as a focus on protecting against discrimination
―almost exclusively in biological terms‖59 and an avoidance of cultural conceptions of race.
Pointing to the court‘s reference to Bo Derek‘s braided hairstyle in 10, Caldwell described the

47

Id. at 232.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 233.
53
Id.
54
Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231–32.
55
See Caldwell, supra note 35, at 571.
56
Caldwell, supra note 10. Caldwell also examined Rogers in her chapter ―Intersectional Bias and the Courts: The
Story of Rogers v. American Airlines‖ in Race Law Stories. See Caldwell, supra note 35.
57
See Caldwell, supra note 10, at 371.
58
Id. at 377; see also Caldwell, supra note 35, at 573 (asserting that ―race and gender discrimination operated
together to affect [Rogers] as a black woman in a way that was not experienced by either white women or black
men‖).
59
Caldwell, supra note 10, at 378.
48
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trivialization of black women‘s hair choices by the court. According to Caldwell, through the
reference to Bo Derek alone, the court not only inaccurately framed Rogers‘s decision to wear a
braided hairstyle, but also implied that there was no relationship between braided hair and the
culture of black woman and incorrectly indicated that black and white women have the same
motivations for wearing braided styles.60
Thereafter, Caldwell cautioned that the prohibitions against braided hairstyles rest upon
notions that once were used to oppose the wearing of Afros.61 Those reasons included
proclamations that Afros were ―extreme, too unusual, not businesslike, inconsistent with a
conservative image, unprofessional, inappropriate with business attire, too ‗black‘ (i.e., too
militant), [and] unclean.‖62
II. HAIR DOS AND DON‘TS
My sista got a brand new perm
my boys says she looks pretty fine body real firm . . .
My sista loves her blackness
but the U.S. says that her perm is her attractiveness.
—Arrested Development, ―Africa‘s Inside Me,‖
Zingalamaduni63

A. SPLITTING HAIRS: UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE HAIR OF BLACK AND WHITE
WOMEN

The Rogers court made the wrong decision on the plaintiff‘s race and gender discrimination
claim. Indeed, unlike Caldwell, who made a cultural argument for Title VII protection in
Rogers, I contend in this Essay that the court reached the incorrect conclusion based upon its
own rationale regarding biology and natural hairstyles. Although the Rogers court clearly
understood that there were significant differences in the structures and textures of black and
white hair—Afros and non-Afros—its ultimate conclusion was rooted in an incomplete or flawed
understanding of black hair, especially as it relates to black women.
The court in Rogers referred to all-braided hairstyles as ―not [being] the product of natural
hair growth but of artifice‖ and then, in the same breath, offered American Airlines‘s suggestion
for Rogers to use a hairpiece as an alternative for her in covering up her naturally grown hair.64
Such language exposes the court‘s incomplete understanding of the full implications of tightly
coiled and kinky hair for black women in the United States. First, the court revealed its

60

Id. at 379–80.
Id. at 384–85. Caldwell, however, identified braided hairstyles as both mutable and immutable, unlike Afros,
which have been identified as immutable. Id.
62
Id.; see also Padgett, supra note 33 (―[B]lack hair has been controversial—especially when worn in its natural
state in styles like Afros, braids, cornrows and dreadlocks.‖).
63
ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT, Africa‟s Inside Me, ZINGALAMADUNI (Capitol Records 2006).
64
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232–33 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
61
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unspoken preference for white hairstyles through its very contention that the use of a ponytail of
straight, artificial hair was an appropriate alternative to the all-braided hairstyle that it called
―artifice.‖ Second, the court exposed its assumption of white traits in Rogers‘s hair through its
suggestion that a black woman could easily pull her hair back into a bun. Packed into that
proposal is an assumption of white hair as the norm. In reality, it is extremely difficult to get
natural, tightly coiled and kinky hair to stay down and pull it back into a bun.
What is important here is that the district court rejected what Blacks identify as a natural
hairstyle—a hairstyle that allows black women to wear their hair down and long while retaining
the natural structure and texture of their hair.65 The district court left unstated society‘s
normative ideal for women‘s hair: straight hair, which hangs down as it grows longer—hair that
is not naturally grown by black women.66 Since the Rogers decision, courts have continued to
uphold employers‘ bans on natural hairstyles for black women, applying Rogers pro forma and
without any analysis about how the biological nature of black women‘s hair should influence the
law in this area.67
After all, the hair of black women is not naturally straight. It is tightly coiled into tiny curls.
Unlike a white woman, for a black woman, receiving a permanent does not mean that she is
curling her hair, but rather the opposite—that she is straightening it.68 One author proclaimed,
―What is unique about African hair is its degree of curliness . . . that [it] is curly to the nth
degree.‖69
The curliness of any individual‘s hair is determined by the shape of that person‘s hair
shafts.70 Each hair grows from a follicle, ―which is the pore from which the hair emerges,‖ with
the hair shaft made of keratin, ―a fibrous protein . . . made up of three different layers of
keratin.‖71 The second layer, the cortex, ―determine[s] the thickness or thinness of [the] hair
shaft.‖72 Additionally, ―flat or oval shaft[s] that grow[] more on one side than the other creat[e]
a curve.‖73 Thus, follicles that extend from those pores—almost flat shaped follicles—grow
curly or tightly coiled hair while round follicles grow straight hair.74

65

See generally LONNICE BRITTENUM BONNER, PLAITED GLORY: FOR COLORED GIRLS WHO'VE CONSIDERED
BRAIDS, LOCKS, AND TWISTS (1996) (discussing and providing tips for how black women can protect, maintain, and
wear their hair naturally).
66
See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Marjorie Florestal, Is a Burrito a Sandwich? Exploring Race,
Class, and Culture in Contracts, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 37 (2008) (identifying the difficulty in challenging
identity norms); Patricia A. Tidwell & Peter Linzer, The Flesh-Colored Band Aid—Contracts, Feminism, Dialogue,
and Norms, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 791, 794 (1991) (―What we see as obvious—often so obvious that we really give it no
thought—may be only one of many ways of looking at things, but a way that has dominated our legal culture for
many years.‖).
67
See, e.g., Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc., No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *5 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008);
McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996).
68
Tina Ezell Hull, Catching the Natural Wave: African American Women Learning to Love Their Hair‟s True
Texture, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 14, 2007, at E1.
69
LONNICE BRITTENUM BONNER, GOOD HAIR: FOR COLORED GIRLS WHO‘VE CONSIDERED WEAVES WHEN THE
CHEMICALS BECAME TOO RUFF 15 (1991).
70
Id. at 17.
71
Id. at 16.
72
Id. at 17. The outside layer, the cuticle, contains the hair‘s coloring, and the third, middle layer, the medulla, is a
soft keratin layer. Id. at 16–17.
73
Id. at 17.
74
Id.
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Most black women have thick cortexes, which results in their having coarse or woolly hair.75
Also, black women‘s hair usually grows out of almost flat-shaped follicles, resulting in tightly
coiled hair, while white women‘s hair tends to grow out of rounded shafts, creating straight
hair.76 The end result is that black women generally have tightly coiled, wooly hair and white
women, who tend to have thinner cortexes than black women, generally have straight, fine
(compared to black women) hair.

B. STRANDS OF ANALYSIS

Little has changed regarding dress codes and the law since Rogers. Even in the face of
changing gender norms in our society, antidiscrimination law continues to reinforce traditional
expectations about appearance. For example, courts continue to uphold policies that require men
to wear their hair short77 or women to wear make-up78 on the ground that such restrictions do not
constitute sex discrimination because they do not impose unequal burdens on one sex over the
other.79 In upholding these codes, courts give legitimacy to the gendered beauty expectations for
men and women, essentially proclaiming that desirable men and women adhere to such gender
norms.80
Jespersen provides an excellent example of such judicial validation of traditional gender
norms in the workplace. Recall again that Harrah‘s Casino required women to wear their hair
down and have it teased, curled, or styled every day; wear stockings; and wear face powder,
blush, mascara, and lip color at all times while only requiring men to wear their hair short and to
have clean, neatly trimmed nails.81
There, the Ninth Circuit held that Harrah‘s policy ―appropriately differentiate[d]‖ the
grooming requirements between women and men and that such differences had ―only a
negligible effect on employment opportunities.‖82 In so doing, the court essentially reinforced
societal gender expectations for women to ―pretty up‖ their faces with make-up, including with
―foundation, blush, mascara, and lip color.‖83 As Judge Pregerson indicated in his dissent, the
majority opinion in Jespersen sent ―[t]he inescapable message . . . that women‘s undoctored
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Id.
Id. at 17–18.
77
See, e.g., Harper v. Blockbuster Entm‘t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998); Tavora v. N.Y.
Mercantile Exch., 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996); Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1257
(N.D. Ind. 1998).
78
See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah‘s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109–12 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
79
See generally Carbado et al., supra note 23, at 135–48 (noting that the Jespersen court‘s decision focused on the
absence of unequal burdens and comparing that decision to other Title VII gender discrimination decisions).
80
See id. at 105–13 (detailing the historical and current norms of make-up for women).
81
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
82
Id. at 1110 (quoting Knott v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975)).
83
Id. at 1114 (Pregerson, J., dissenting); see also Kirsten Dellinger & Christine L. Williams, Makeup at Work:
Negotiating Appearance Rules in the Workplace, 11 GENDER & SOC‘Y 151, 158 (1997) (finding that one of the
reasons that many women wear make-up is ―because it makes them feel confident about themselves,‖ ―more
polished,‖ ―prepared to meet the public,‖ and ―[m]ore attractive‖).
76
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faces compare unfavorably to men‘s, . . . that women‘s faces are incomplete, unattractive, or
unprofessional without full makeup.‖84
Validation of this message was further supported by the majority‘s refusal to acknowledge
the burdens imposed on women by societal make-up norms.85 In pointing out how obvious these
burdens are on Harrah‘s female bartenders, Judge Kozinski argued:
[I]s there any doubt that putting on makeup costs money and takes time? Harrah‘s policy
requires women to apply face powder, blush, mascara and lipstick. You don‘t need an
expert witness to figure out that such items don‘t grow on trees.
Nor is there any rational doubt that application of makeup is an intricate and
painstaking process that requires considerable time and care. Even those of us who don‘t
wear makeup know how long it can take from the hundreds of hours we‘ve spent over the
years frantically tapping our toes and pointing to our wrists. It‘s hard to imagine that a
woman could ―put on her face,‖ as they say, in the time it would take a man to shave—
certainly not if she were to do the careful and thorough job Harrah‘s expects. Makeup,
moreover, must be applied and removed every day; the policy burdens men with no such
daily ritual. While a man could jog to the casino, slip into his uniform, and get right to
work, a woman must travel to work so as to avoid smearing her makeup, or arrive early
to put on her makeup there.
It might have been tidier if Jespersen had introduced evidence as to the time and
cost associated with complying with the makeup requirement, but I can understand her
failure to do so, as these hardly seem like questions reasonably subject to dispute. We
could—and should—take judicial notice of these incontrovertible facts.86

Such failure to acknowledge what Judge Kozinski referred to as ―incontrovertible‖ not only
gave Harrah‘s grooming requirements legal weight but also added legitimacy to the idea that the
grooming requirements‘ burdens on women are normal, reasonable, and unworthy of challenge.
The sad fact is that Jespersen simply follows a line of cases that have maintained and legitimated
gender norms.87 Moreover, it made matters worse for future plaintiffs who, because of the
court‘s refusal to take judicial notice, would have to go to great lengths to support their claims by
putting forensic cosmetologists on the stand to prove the obvious about the costs of makeup
application in terms of money and time.
Much like with gender, little has changed in antidiscrimination law in regard to race and
dress codes. No court or agency has even implied that Afro hairstyles are not protected. The
strongest case concerning the protection of Afros as a racial characteristic under Title VII came
in 1971, after the Civil Rights Movement and on the tail end of the Black Power Movement. In
that case, the employer‘s policy provided as follows: ―The hair is not to be kept bushy and
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Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1116 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1111 (majority opinion) (refusing to ―take judicial notice of the fact that it costs more money and takes more
time for a woman to comply with the makeup requirement than it takes for a man to comply with the requirement
that he keep his hair short‖).
86
Id. at 1117 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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See, e.g., supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text; see also POST, supra note 4, at 44 (―What seems in fact to be
driving the outcome in Willingham is the conviction that employers reasonably may impose sex-based stereotypes in
matters of grooming, so long as these stereotypes conform to traditional gender conventions.‖).
85
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should not extend in line of sight beyond the ears.‖88 The plaintiff, a black male, filed a claim of
race discrimination under Title VII, contending that the employer ―discharged him because his
Afro-American hair style did not conform to the company‘s standards of uniform appearance‖
and stating that ―his hair style is a manifestation of his racial identity.‖89 In evaluating that claim,
the EEOC determined that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of race,
reasoning that applying the ―‗line of sight‘ hair grooming policy to all employees, without regard
to their racially different physiological and cultural characteristics, tends to adversely affect
Negroes because they have a texture of hair different from Caucasians.‖90
Thereafter, many other courts followed suit, either in their holding or dicta. For example, in
Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., the plaintiff filed a charge of
discrimination after she had changed her hairstyle to an Afro and experienced resistance from her
employer.91 For three years before, her supervisor had had no problem with her or her hair,92 but
when the plaintiff changed her hairstyle to an Afro, her supervisor told her that she ―could never
represent Blue Cross with [her] Afro.‖93 In finding that the plaintiff‘s charge was sufficient to
support allegations in the complaint of both racial and sex discrimination, the Seventh Circuit
reasoned as follows: ―A lay person‘s description of racial discrimination could hardly be more
explicit. The reference to the Afro hairstyle was merely the method by which the plaintiff‘s
supervisor allegedly expressed the employer‘s racial discrimination.‖94 Similarly, and more
recently, courts such as those in Rogers and McBride have hinted at protection for Afros,
asserting that ―an employer‘s policy prohibiting the ‗Afro/bush‘ style might offend Title VII.‖ 95
Still, though, courts continue to uphold employers‘ identification of natural hairstyles such
as cornrows and braids, which are predominantly worn by black women, as unprofessional,
extreme, or unusual forms of grooming that can be banned in the workplace.96 For example, in
2008, the district court in Pitts v. Wild Adventures, Inc. rejected the plaintiff‘s discrimination
claim based on the employer‘s ―memo that prohibited ‗dreadlocks, cornrows, beads, and shells‘
that are not ‗covered by a hat/visor.‘‖97 Pitts‘s supervisor had told her to get her hair done in a
―pretty style‖ and refused to allow Pitts to wear cornrows or twists because they ―had the look of
dreadlocks.‖98 In rejecting Pitts‘s discrimination claim, the court reasoned that ―[d]readlocks and
cornrows are not immutable characteristics‖ and ―[t]he fact that the hairstyle might be
predominantly worn by a particular protected group is not sufficient to bring the grooming policy
within the scope of‖ the law.99
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E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71-244, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 18 (June 10, 1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
90
Id. The EEOC even endorsed a cultural argument for protecting Afros, ―not[ing] that the wearing of an AfroAmerican hair style by a Negro has been so appropriated as a cultural symbol by members of the Negro race as to
make its suppression . . . an automatic badge of racial prejudice.‖ Id.
91
538 F.2d 164, 167 (7th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 168.
95
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996).
96
See, e.g., McBride, 1996 WL 755779, at *2–3.
97
No. 7:06-CV-62-HL, 2008 WL 1899306, at *1, *6 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 25, 2008).
98
Id. at *1.
99
Id. at *6. Courts have held the same with regard to black men who wear their hair in styles such as locks, though
black men are not the subject of this Essay. For example, in Eatman v. United Parcel Service, the district court
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In fact, even in cases where the employer‘s treatment of the plaintiff occurred precisely
because she was black, courts have found no disparate treatment discrimination. For example, in
Santee v. Windsor Court Hotel L.P., the district court determined that the employer was not
liable for race discrimination under Title VII where the employer refused to hire a black woman
with dyed blonde hair, but not white women with dyed blonde hair, on the ground that the black
woman violated its grooming policy against ―extremes in hair color.‖100
One noteworthy change in race-based antidiscrimination law, however, has occurred with
respect to race and facial hair. In some early antidiscrimination cases, courts were hesitant to
extend the rationale for protecting Afro hairstyles to facial hair restriction cases, even where the
requirement of shaved facial hair caused black men to suffer from pseudofolliculitis barbae
(PFB),101 a painful skin disorder resulting from ingrown hairs that is scientifically proven to be

rejected the black male plaintiff‘s disparate treatment race discrimination claim on the ground that ―Title VII does
not prohibit discrimination on the basis of locked hair‖ and his disparate impact claim on the ground that the
plaintiff had ―shown only that a large percentage of those employees with what UPS considers ‗unbusinesslike‘ hair
are black employees.‖ 194 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262, 266–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) see also D. Aaron Lacy, Hair Today,
Gone Tomorrow: Conforming for Hire, 64 MIAMI L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1-3) (chronicling his
job search experiences while wearing locks in his hair)
100
No. Civ.A.99-3891, 2000 WL 1610775, at *1, *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2000). One could argue that blonde hair
color is extreme on black women because black women are less likely than white women to be natural blondes.
Several questions arise from this argument, however. First, many black women who are admired for their
appearance, including Beyonce, Mary J. Blige, and Tyra Banks, dye their hair blonde. Would these women lose
their job or not be hired because of their hair color choice while a star such as Christina Ricci or Angelica Huston
would not, despite an ―unnatural‖ look on them, simply because they are white? Second, and more importantly, if
the likelihood of natural blonde hair is viewed here as determinative, why shouldn‘t the likelihood of having a
certain structure and texture of hair be determinative in braids or locks cases? The Rogers court determined that
there was no discrimination against black women due to American Airlines‘s prohibition of braids because black
and white women were both subject to the policy. If receiving the exact same treatment, regardless of any
substantive meaning, is paramount in Rogers, why shouldn‘t the same principle apply in Santee? Third, even if the
employer‘s regulation was to label all dyed hair as ―extreme,‖ how would the enforcement of that regulation not
disproportionately affect black women? One can easily imagine a situation in which black women with anything but
black hair would be required to prove that their hair color is natural, while white women would routinely be
presumed to be wearing their natural color, except when they are wearing truly extreme colors such as pink or
purple. The irony of Santee is that the plaintiff was completely conforming to the normative ideal for women:
straight, blond hair.
101
One court described the disorder in more detail:
Pseudofolliculitis barbae . . . is a facial skin condition that afflicts certain persons with curly
or kinky hair follicles. After shaving, the curved hair follicles cause the already curly hair to curve
back into contact with the skin surface, and pierce and re-enter the skin, forming a pseudofollicle.
The pseudofollicle becomes inflamed, and painful papules and pustules result. In severe cases,
abscesses develop around the pseduofollicles and, if untreated, cause scarring, hyperpigmentation,
and disfigurement. Once a person is afflicted by PFB, it lasts the person‘s lifetime.
There is no cure for PFB. A person afflicted by the condition, however, may induce
remission by growing a beard one-quarter inch in length. Such ‗beard therapy‘ is the standard
medical treatment for PFB. The remission obtained through beard therapy is nearly complete. The
condition will redevelop if a person resumes shaving. PFB is an immutable condition that, with
few exceptions, afflicts only male blacks.
Richardson v. Quick Trip Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1151, 1153–54 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
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―unique or at least almost unique to blacks.‖102 For example, in Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
the district court held that the employer‘s grooming restriction on beards did not violate Title
VII, even though the plaintiff suffered from PFB and did not shave due to the advice of a
dermatologist, because the ―no beard‖ policy applied equally to Blacks and Whites and therefore
did not result in disparate treatment on the basis of race.103 Additionally, although organizations
such as the ―United States Army permit[ted] blacks with PFB to wear beards because the army
ha[d] concluded that PFB is a physical disability to which only blacks are susceptible,‖104 early
courts initially refused to acknowledge such disparate impact claims on the ground that the
contested grooming regulation did not touch upon any characteristic that is unique to Blacks.
For instance, in ruling in favor of the employer in EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., the court
reasoned: ―The wearing of beards is not a characteristic that is peculiar to any race. Nor can the
incidence of beard-wearing among black workers be attributed to a long history of inferior
education in segregated schools, unlike the uneven test score issues at Griggs v. Duke Power
Co[mpany].‖105
Within a short period of time, however, courts began to recognize such facial hair cases as
raising viable racial discrimination claims, assuming there were no legitimate business purposes,
such as safety, for the grooming requirements.106 Although these lawsuits involved disparate
impact claims, not disparate treatment claims, the courts‘ reasoning in these later cases often
drew a connection between hair and biology. They indirectly acknowledged race as a social
construction, highlighting hair as just one of many characteristics that are used to define race. 107
For instance, in EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., the court acknowledged the black male plaintiff‘s
disparate impact claim as race discrimination, asserting that the employer had to have a
legitimate business purpose for its grooming prohibition on beards in light of proof that PFB
affects twenty-five percent of the black male population.108 The judge reasoned: ―I
wholeheartedly agree that the wearing of beards is not a characteristic peculiar to any race, but
on the proof made in this case, the characteristic which must be thought about is susceptibility to
pseudofolliculitis barbae—not the wearing of beards—and that physical characteristic is
peculiar to blacks.‖109 In essence, in these cases, courts recognized claims of race discrimination
based on the unique texture and structure of black hair, which makes black men susceptible to
PFB.110 They understood and acknowledged that hair, just like skin color, is just one proxy for
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EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 56 (D. Colo. 1981).
420 F. Supp. 35, 42–43 (E.D. Va. 1976). The court also found no disparate impact on the basis of race because
the ―slight racial impact‖ was not sufficient to override the employer‘s legitimate business purpose of cleanliness.
Id. Alternatively, the court held that the ―no beard‖ policy served a legitimate business purpose even if there was
some discriminatory impact. Id. at 42–43.
104
Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. at 56–57.
105
635 F.2d 188, 190 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980).
106
See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1121 (11th Cir. 1993) (denying a discrimination claim by a black
man suffering from PFB on the grounds of safety).
107
See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Multiracialism and the Social Construction of Race: The Story of
Hudgins v. Wright, in RACE LAW STORIES 147 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008) (identifying
physical characteristics as an important component of racial identity); see also Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes
Part One: Playing in the Light, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 695, 705 (1996) (same).
108
530 F. Supp 54, 56 (D. Colo 1981).
109
Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
110
See, e.g., Johnson v. Memphis Police Dep‘t, 713 F. Supp. 244, 247–48 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) (recognizing a claim
of race discrimination based on PFB).
103
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race, a social construction. Indeed, in her dissent in Greyhound Lines, Judge Dolores Sloviter
explicitly made this argument, declaring: ―A ‗no beard‘ policy is to be treated no differently than
any other employment policy, and indeed should be subjected to exacting inquiry since the skin
condition it affects results from an immutable physical characteristic.‖111
In sum, in articulating PFB as a product of the immutable physical characteristic of black
hair, these courts unknowingly placed the PFB cases in line with other cases that have exposed,
even if unintentionally, the ways in which race is constructed by numerous factors such as hair,
nose width, and skin color, the most common proxy for race. In fact, some authors contend that
hair served as the true signifier of race in early racial trials; for example, Ayana Byrd and Lori
Tharps wrote:
Curiously, the hair was considered the most telling feature of Negro status, more than the
color of the skin. Even though some slaves . . . had skin as light as many Whites, the rule
of thumb was that if the hair showed just a little bit of kinkiness, a person would be
unable to pass as White. Essentially, the hair acted as the true test of blackness, which is
why some slaves opted to shave their heads to try to get rid of the genetic evidence of
their ancestry when attempting to escape to freedom.112

This history of constructing race by factors such as hair and nose width is long and varied,
including cases such as the 1806 decision in Hudgins v. Wrights.113 In Hudgins, the Supreme
Court of Virginia relied on examinations of three women‘s hair and nose width to determine that
they were American Indian and free, rather than black and enslaved.114 In its decision, the
Supreme Court of Virginia declared that people of African descent had been stamped with three
distinct characteristics that would not and could not disappear easily: (1) dark skin; (2) a flat
nose; and (3) woolly hair, with the texture of the hair being the strongest ―ingredient in the
African constitution.‖115 The court also noted hair as a distinguishing characteristic for
American Indians, referring to ―giving . . . the jet black lank hair of the Indian a degree of
flexure, which never fails to betray that the party distinguished by it, cannot trace his lineage
purely from the race of native Americans.‖116 As Professor Ian Haney López declared in his
article The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and
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EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 1980).
AYANA D. BYRD & LORI L. THARPS, HAIR STORY: UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF BLACK HAIR IN AMERICA 17–18
(2001); see also INGRID BANKS, HAIR MATTERS: BEAUTY, POWER, AND BLACK WOMEN‘S CONSCIOUSNESS 7 (2000)
(citing Willie Morrow‘s 400 Years Without a Comb, which argued that ―skin color and ‗curly or kinky hair‘ are so
intertwined that it is hard to separate the two when examining the forces that shape black people‘s lives‖); ORLANDO
PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 61 (1982) (―Hair type rapidly became the real
symbolic badge of slavery, although like many powerful symbols it was disguised, in this case by the linguistic
device of using the term ‗black,‘ which nominally threw the emphasis to color.‖); cf. DON HERZOG, POISONING THE
MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 458 (1998) (―Think too of how easy it is to become invested in others‘ hair, to see it
as betraying distasteful facts. One antislavery writer denied that the woolly hair of Negroes was a badge of
inferiority.‖).
113
11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806).
114
Id. at 138–40.
115
Id. at 139.
116
Hudgins, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) at 139 (emphasis added).
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Page 20 of 47

Choice, ―[a]fter unknown lives lost in slavery, Judge Tucker freed three generations of women
because Hannah‘s hair was long and straight.‖117
Though Hudgins itself embraces disturbing rationales, its lessons about the social
construction of race should not be ignored. Regardless of public desire to become ―postracial,‖118 race continues to be defined by proxies such as skin color and hair in our society and
continues to have significance within the workplace. Antidiscrimination law should
acknowledge these realities. Indeed, it is worth noting that the same hair types that were
constructed as signifiers of ―freedom‖ or inclusion into ―normal society‖ in Hudgins continue to
be used as signifiers of the ―norm‖ and the ―acceptable‖ in Title VII grooming code cases.
III. PERMANENT DAMAGE
But I thought that the boys were born with Afros and the girls were born with straight
hair.
—A white female, high school friend, in response to my explanation
about needing to touch up my relaxed hair

In past grooming code cases, plaintiffs have not argued that black female, natural hairstyles
should be viewed as a racial characteristic based on biology. Instead, they have accepted the
identification of these hairstyles as mutable, choosing to base their race discrimination claims on
cultural connections. For example, the plaintiff in Rogers predicated her claim in part on her
understanding of braided hairstyles as ―part of the cultural and historical essence of Black
American women.‖119 Caldwell also based her assessments on culture, maintaining that the
Rogers court too narrowly ―limit[ed] protection against discrimination to the physical
manifestations of racial identity . . . and denying protection for identity-related choices of
personal expression.‖120
Although such culture-based arguments are appealing because of how they encompass
responses to discrimination based on racial stereotyping,121 lawyers also should consider
117

Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice,
29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994).
118
See Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1591–93 (2009) (noting the increasing calls after
Obama‘s election that the United States is post-racial); see also Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 107, at 164–73
(analyzing contemporary lessons from Hudgins).
119
Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted).
120
Caldwell, supra note 35, at 571.
121
See Kevin R. Johnson & George A. Martinez, Discrimination by Proxy: The Case of Proposition 227 and the
Ban on Bilingual Education, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1247–75 (2000) (analyzing discrimination by proxy
where actors use characteristics associated with a minority group—specifically Latinos, such as language and
immigration status, to discriminate on the basis of race and ethnicity); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes,
By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal
Are White, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1297–1312 (examining situations where individuals used factors such as names
on résumés or voices over the phone to discriminate in the selection of job candidates or rental housing applicants);
Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1172–94 (2004) (analyzing how employers regulate race and gender under Title VII to
postulate the existence of intentional discrimination where employers use appearance and grooming standards to
shape identity performance). See generally D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What‟s Hair (and Other Race-Based
Characteristics) Got to Do with It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1360–94 (2008) (arguing for a judicial analysis in a
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bringing intersectional discrimination claims based upon biological considerations. In fact,
critics have presented two problems in relying solely on culture-based arguments for black
female plaintiffs in grooming discrimination cases. First, culture-based positions present the
problem of essentialism and definitional boundaries. In his book Racial Culture: A Critique,
Professor Richard Ford contends that antidiscrimination law ―should limit the formal
acknowledgement of race to its most formal and culturally empty definition.‖122 According to
Ford, centering legal protections around cultural or racially-correlated characteristics presents the
practical problem of determining where to draw the boundaries.123 For example, he asks, how
would courts define which hair styles are culturally African American?124 Additionally, Ford
argues, cultural arguments highlight the dangers of essentialism.125 For instance, he questions,
how can braids be considered culturally African American if a significant segment of black
women reject them as part of their culture?126
In addition to presenting challenges of defining boundaries and escaping essentialism, the
Rogers-type of culture-based arguments have not fully unpacked the underlying basis for the
discrimination at hand: the presumption and identification of white women‘s hair as the baseline
for women or, as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission asserted with respect to an
employer‘s restriction on Afros, the measurement of black female plaintiffs ―against a standard
that assumes non-Negro hair characteristics.‖127 The problem with current case law is not that it
does not understand race as a social construct—at least loosely speaking—but rather that it limits
this understanding too narrowly.
Although the language in cases such as Rogers indicates that courts define race as skin color
alone, the language in cases such as Jenkins suggests that courts‘ understanding of race is
actually much broader, acknowledging the way in which race is socially constructed and defined
by many phenotypical factors such as hair, nose width, and skin color.128 Were this implicit
more historical and contemporary social context to ascertain whether the employers‘ decisions perpetuate racial
stigmatization); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
803, 803–64 (2004) (arguing for more focus on the dehumanizing meanings associated with race in
antidiscrimination law); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, Lakisha and Jamal Go to Work: Analyzing
Workplace Appearance and Grooming Standards as ―Racial Stereotyping‖ (manuscript draft on file with the author)
(arguing for a mixed-motive, racial stereotyping framework).
122
RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 13 (2005); see also Keith Aoki & Kevin R. Johnson,
An Assessment of LatCrit Theory Ten Years After, 83 IND. L.J. 1151, 1190 (2008) (―To Ford, denial of the ―right‖ to
wear cornrows at work falls in the domain of cultural self-expression.‖).
123
FORD, supra note 122, at 12.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 24–25. For a definition of race and gender essentialism, see Harris, supra note 37, at 585 (defining gender
essentialism as a notion that there is ―a unitary, ‗essential‘ women‘s experience . . . isolated and described
independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience‖).
126
FORD, supra note 122, at 24–26.
127
E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71-244, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 18 (June 10, 1971) (determining that applying the
employer‘s ―‗line of sight‘ hair grooming policy to all employees, without regard to their racially different
physiological and cultural characteristics, tends to adversely affect Negroes because they have a texture of hair
different from Caucasians.‖).
128
See id. (holding that while an employer‘s line of sight grooming policy was equally enforced, it adversely
affected black employees who naturally have a different texture hair from white employees); see also Jenkins v.
Blue Cross Mutual Hosp. Ins., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that the plaintiff had a valid Title VII claim
where she alleged that her employer fired her because of her Afro hairstyle). It is important to note that race also
has been defined, both in historical and contemporary terms, by performance. See Ariela J. Gross, Litigating
Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 118–21 (1998)
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understanding not the case, courts would have never recognized bans on Afros as racial
discrimination at all. In fact, Ford acknowledges as much about the role of hair in defining race
when he contends that protections from discrimination should revolve around race, not culture,
noting that Danny Glover, a famous black actor, experienced difficulty in getting a taxi ―not
because he hailed [cabs] in a culturally distinctive manner but because of the color of his skin
and the texture of his hair.‖129 What antidiscrimination law needs is for lawyers and courts to
make explicit this understanding of race as a social construct and extend such racialized analysis
for the protection of the Afro hairstyle—which is based on biology—to braids, locks, and twists
for black women.
Admittedly, it is dangerous for lawyers to rest too much of any argument for Title VII
protections upon ―biological‖ immutability. As Caldwell contends, ―[a] formalistic approach
separates the fact of discrimination from the history, culture, and conditions of the society that
produced and continues to produce inequality.‖130 However, my claim here is not that race is
purely biological or that biological arguments are the only way—or even the best way—to grant
black women protection from discriminatory grooming codes under Title VII. Instead, my
argument here is much narrower and decidedly strategic. My claim is that, but for the courts‘
incorrect assumptions about black women‘s hair, black women would already be protected from
employers‘ prohibitions of braided, locked, and twisted hairstyles, just as black men (as well as
black women) are protected from certain employer restrictions on Afro hairstyles. If courts
carefully thought through and considered the nature of black women‘s hair, they would view
employer bans on natural hairstyles to be just as discriminatory as employer bans on brown skin,
another proxy for race and another proxy that can be altered with money, time, effort, and
damage to the psyche. In this sense, it is not immutability, but biology and the reasonableness of
requiring people to make biological changes, that governs antidiscrimination law in the
grooming code arena. Lawyers need to explain and courts need to recognize the implicit
demands for changes in hair structure and texture that currently exist in employers‘ prohibitions
of black women‘s natural hairstyles. Moreover, the law needs to move beyond viewing these
required changes to black women‘s hair structure and texture as reasonable.
IV. EXTENSIONS TO A HAIR PIECE
I remember I went to interview for a job and the guy wouldn‘t hire me because I had an
Afro. A white guy. He said, ―It‘s your hair. I don‘t like your hairstyle. You‘ve got to
do something about your hair. . . . I think that both white and Black employers,
especially men, expect African American women to have straight hairstyles as opposed to
their own natural hairstyles.

(detailing how determinations of race by juries during the nineteenth century often turned on witness testimony
regarding hair color, hair texture, facial features, and social performances); see also Haney López, supra note 117, at
49–50 (―For example, seemingly inconsequential acts like listening to rap and wearing hip hop fashions constitute a
means of racial affiliation and identification.‖); Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the United States,
112 YALE L.J. 1473, 1479 (2003) (discussing how ―scholars have shown [that] scientific notions of race such as
genealogy or physical appearance have never been the courts‘ sole or even preferred type of evidence for
determining race‖).
129
FORD, supra note 122, at 8 (emphasis added).
130
Caldwell, supra note 35, at 599.
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—Norma, a black woman131

In 1991, Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw applied her theory of intersectionality, which
recognizes that power, privilege, disadvantage, and discrimination are influenced by interlocking
spectrums of identity, to employment discrimination law.132 Structural intersectionality
describes the phenomenon when ―overlapping dynamics of class, race, and gender, among
others, can create a specific vulnerability, insight, and social disenfranchisement based on
situated identities and social locations, dependent on the interaction of each structural
dynamic.‖133 This feature of intersectionality concentrates on how power structures and
institutions work to reinforce and perpetuate systems of subordination.134 For example, as
Professor Crenshaw highlighted in her article, because the identities of black men and black
women differ along the intersection of race, class, and sex, black men and black women may
have distinct vulnerabilities to violence and may actually experience discrimination differently
from one another.135
This Part highlights the unique way in which black women are discriminated against at the
intersection of race and sex through employers‘ bans on natural black hairstyles such as braids,
locks, and twists. Specifically, it argues that, when the sex-based grooming code cases that
address hair length for men and women and the race-based grooming code cases that govern
Afros and beards that cannot be worn due to PFB are viewed together and against each other,
they reveal the way in which black women receive less protection from the law than both white
women and black men in their attempts to satisfy society‘s gendered expectations for
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Weitz, supra note 11, at 681.
See generally Crenshaw, supra note 6 (explaining that women of color are at the intersection of race and gender
oppression). Section 15 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Compliance Manual now includes a
brief explanation of intersectional discrimination. It reads in its entirety:
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Title VII prohibits discrimination not just because of one protected trait (e.g., race), but also
because of the intersection of two or more protected bases (e.g., race and sex).‖ For example,
Title VII prohibits discrimination against African American women even if the employer does not
discriminate against White women or African American men. Likewise, Title VII protects Asian
American women from discrimination based on stereotypes and assumptions about them ―even in
the absence of discrimination against Asian American men or White women.‖ The law also
prohibits individuals from being subjected to discrimination because of the intersection of their
race and a trait covered by another EEO statute—e.g., race and disability, or race and age.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM‘N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 15-IV(C) (2006), available at
http://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.pdf.
133
Beth Ribet, Emotion, Power Relations, and Restorative Justice: A Review of Compulsory Compassion by
Annalise Acorn, 15 UCLA WOMEN‘S L.J. 115, 127 n. 60 (2006) (discussing Crenshaw‘s theory of structural
intersectionality); see also Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on the Nomination and Confirmation of the First Latina
Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court: The “High Tech Lynching” of a “Wise Latina”? 20 (University of California,
Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 188, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460932 (―Women of color . . . are generally speaking more disadvantaged in American
social life than either white women or men of color—groups whose members generally possess only a single
subordinating characteristic.‖).
134
See Ribet, supra note 133, at 127 n.60; see also Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to
Dismantle the Master‟s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 16, 17 (1995).
135
Crenshaw, supra note 6, at 139–41; Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1245–96 (1991).
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appearance.136 Of course, there are problems underlying these appearance expectations, but this
Essay leaves that discussion for another paper. In our society, individuals are constrained in
their agency by societal expectations and rules within the workplace. Regardless of how one
views appearance expectations in our society, it is fair to say that black women should not suffer
the double whammy of being bound to these expectations and then deprived of any option for
achieving them because of flawed understandings about how the structure and texture of their
hair can impact the manner in which they can comply with grooming requirements.
Section A of this Part analyzes what the raced and gendered assumptions about women‘s
hair in grooming discrimination cases reveal about biases against natural black hair. Section B
shows how employers‘ bans on natural hairstyles intentionally discriminate against black women
at the intersection of race and sex. Thereafter, it demonstrates how grooming policies that
convey implicit demands for black women to relax or otherwise straighten their hair discriminate
against them on the basis of race and gender by placing an undue burden on black women.
Finally, section C explicates how bans on black women‘s natural hairstyles are discriminatory
under traditional disparate impact theories because black women are more likely to be affected
by policies that ban braids, locks, or twists, regardless of whether many choose to actually
straighten their hair.
A. GOOD AND BAD HAIR: HAIR BIASES IN THE WORKPLACE

The fact that courts such as the Rogers court have assumed away the work for black women
in straightening their hair is not surprising. As one black woman who recently began to wear her
hair naturally through locks proclaimed, ―[Black hair is] a tight, tight, tiny curl. It‘s a curl that‘s
unfamiliar to other cultures, only because we‘ve been pressing it for so long.‖137 Additionally, as
Professors Ashleigh Shelby Rosette and Tracy Dumas have explained, there is a tendency and
even an incentive for professional black women not to highlight the obstacles that they face in
straightening their hair and keeping it straight because many black women have no desire to
highlight their racial difference in a white corporate structure where conformity is often the key
to success.138 Furthermore, because black women are ―[f]aced with a dominant culture that
already defines them as less attractive and feminine than other women, they are more likely to
seek out a style that looks ‗professional‘ but still meets mainstream norms of femininity,‖ relying
―on wigs or on expensive formulations for changing the natural texture of their hair and
136

See Rosette & Dumas, supra note 7, at 409–10 (―The expectation of hair straightening falls solely on Black
women and not on Black men. In fact, Black men are expected to wear their hair in its natural state—though the
expectation is for keeping it short and conservatively groomed. Accordingly, the hairstyle dilemma for Black
women is both uniquely racialized and gendered.‖). Ford asks, ―[I]sn‘t the desire for long, flowing hairstyles
actually a symptom of the Eurocentric grooming norms that [the right to braids] is supposed to resist?‖ FORD, supra
note 122, at 27.
137
Hull, supra note 68.
138
See Rosette & Dumas, supra note 7, at 412, 415 (―[W]e argue that Black women conform primarily because they
seek to minimize the perception that they are different from their colleagues and because they want to avoid the
pitfalls of stereotyping.‖); see also Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning A Title VII Remedy for Transparently White
Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2009–30 (1995) (creating two fictional, black sisters, Yvonne
Taylor and Keisha Akbar, who perform their racial identities differently in their corporate workplaces, and detailing
how Keisha, who ―place[d] an emphasis on her African heritage,‖ would find it more difficult to advance an
employment discrimination claim).
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avoid[ing] . . . hairstyles that others might associate with radical political stances (such as
dreadlocks or Afros).‖139
On top of the absence of a full understanding about black women‘s hair structure and texture
as well as black women‘s natural hairstyles is a general discomfort with natural black hairstyles.
In a society where straight, long, fine (compared to black hair) hair is viewed not only as the
norm but as the ideal for women, tightly coiled black hair easily becomes categorized as
unacceptable, unprofessional, deviant, and too political. Image consultants routinely advise
black women to remove hairstyles such as braids and locks. For instance, in 2007, Ashley
Baker, an associate editor at Glamour magazine, told a room full of female attorneys at Cleary,
Gottlieb, Steen, & Hamilton that Afro-styled hairdos and dreadlocks are Glamour don‘ts.140
Reportedly, Baker also said, ―No offense, but those political hairstyles really have to go.‖141
Later, Baker caught flak for the comment after attorneys lobbied complaints and even lost her
job, but the fact that she felt comfortable making this assertion to a room full of attorneys speaks
volumes about the biases against black women‘s natural hair, including Afros, which are
protected as a racial characteristic under the law.142
Not only have non-Blacks internalized appearance norms that mark white, long hair as the
normative ideal for women, but so have Blacks.143 The internalization of these norms by black
women begins at an early age. One author asserted that internalization of these standards begins
around age three or four.144 Famous comedian Chris Rock became inspired to create his awardwinning documentary Good Hair when his young daughter asked him, ―Why don‘t I have good
hair?‖145 Similarly, Whoopi Goldberg, who wears her hair in short, thick dreadlocks, became

139

Weitz, supra note 11, at 678 (citation omitted); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262–63 (2000) (describing how women and people of color attempt to alter their racial
identities in order to prevent discrimination and preempt stereotyping in the workplace); Kenji Yoshino, Covering,
111 YALE L.J. 769, 892 (2002).
140
Padgett, supra note 33.
141
Id.
142
See supra note 33.
143
In my own personal experience, the most vocal protesters to my decision to lock my hair were Blacks, who
viewed such a decision as a career-limiting gesture. See also Padgett, supra note 33 (noting that ―most black
women—especially those in high-ranking positions . . . chemically straighten their hair‖). The empirics bear out,
however, that black women who make $100,000 a year or more are the most likely of any income group of black
women to wear their hair naturally and unprocessed. MINTEL INT‘L GROUP, BLACK HAIRCARE - US - AUGUST 2009 MARKET RESEARCH REPORT, fig. 36 (―Frequency of relaxer treatments, by household income, June 2009‖) (on file
with author). Many of the most prominent black female faces are adorned by relaxed hair, and, in many cases,
artificial, straight hair, otherwise known as weaves. For example, Oprah Winfrey and Michelle Obama both relax
their hair, and model Tyra Banks is famous for her long weaves. In fact, Banks received nationwide for appearing
on her talk show without a weave. Tyra Banks to Reveal Her “Real Hair,” USMAGAZINE.COM, Aug. 17, 2009,
http://www.usmagazine.com/moviestvmusic/news/tyra-banks-to-reveal-her-real-hair-2009178. This Essay does not
contend that such relaxed or chemically treated hairstyles are unacceptable or improper. They are suitable choices
for black women. Rather, this Essay contends that the implicit demands in many employer dress codes and in
society in general often leave black women with no choice but to relax or otherwise straighten their hair.
144
Bellinger, supra note 115, at 66; see also White, supra note 2, at 301 (―I remember at an early age the weekly
ritual of getting my hair pressed . . . . This ritual took place on Saturday afternoons in order to look ‗presentable‘ for
church . . . . I was told not to play ‗too hard‘ so that my hair would not ‗go back‘ (to its natural state). . . . At an early
age, I internalized that my natural born hair was not good enough; it was not acceptable enough to make me worthy
of being presentable.‖).
145
One author defined ―good hair‖ within the black community as ―hair which is long, straight, and has a silky
feeling or when one had seemingly Caucasian hair.‖ Bellinger, supra note 115, at 67; see also BONNER, supra note
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famous for her comedy routine, in which she draped a towel over her head, reminisced about her
childhood, pretended to be a young black girl again, and bragged about her ―long luxurious
blonde hair.‖146 The skit resonated and continues to resonate strongly with black women, many
of whom have recalled how they, too, threw towels over their heads as children to create long,
luxurious hair.147
Perhaps the strictest adherents to these racialized beauty norms are black professional
employers and educators. For example, Carl Dameron, a black owner of a public relations and
advertising firm in California, tells his black female employees that ―outside of short-cropped
Afros, most ethnic hairstyles are a ‗no-no‘ in his office.‖148 Even at Hampton University, which,
like many historically black universities, has a proud history of educating many promising black
students, the business school has grooming codes that ban natural hairstyles, such as braids,
locks, and twists, as unprofessional. Hampton‘s policy, which was implemented for students in
its five-year Bachelor of Arts/Masters of Business Administration program, provides that
―[b]raids, dreadlocks and other unusual hairstyles are not acceptable.‖149 Moreover, Hampton is
not shy about expressing its rationale for the ban—that Blacks must learn to live and work in
white corporate environments, where black hairstyles are not accepted.150 Despite resistance
from students, faculty, and staff on campus,151 the dean of the business school, Sid Credle, insists

65, at 1 (describing the standard definition of ―good hair‖ within the black community as ―[h]air that‘s naturally
straight, loosely curled or waved‖); Rosette & Dumas, supra note 7, at 418 (explaining that a black woman‘s
statement that she straightened her hair to make it look ―better‖ ―implicitly assumes that the natural state of many
Whites‘ hair is indeed ‗better‘ that the natural state of Blacks‘ hair‖); cf. Patton, note 26, at 38 (noting that ―bad
hair‖ has been associated with kinky hair).
146
See Lanita Jacobs-Huey, Enacting Racial and Gendered Authenticity in Black Hair Humor, May 26, 2007,
http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~jacobshu/ALA07.pdf. Here is Whoopi Goldberg‘s routine in relevant part:
((Swinging white shirt on her head)) This is my long and luxurious blonde hair. Ain‘t it pretty?
((Audience: Yeah!)) I can put it in a ponytail. Wanna see? ((Goldberg turns around, grabs the
shirt and swings shirt sleeves)). . . My momma made me go to my room, cause she said this
wasn‘t nothing but a shirt on my head and I said, ―Nuh unh, this is my long luxurious blonde
hair.‖ She said, ―Nuh unh, fool, that‘s a shirt!‖ And I said, ―You a fool. It‘s my hair.‖ She made
me go to my room. But I don‘t care because when I get big, I‘ma get fifty million trillion million
million elephants and I‘ma let ‗em go in the house so they can trample on everybody. And then
she gonna want me to make ‗em stop but she ain‘t even gonna know I‘m there because I‘ma have
blonde hair, blue eyes, and I‘ma be White. . . . I AM! Uh huh! And then I‘ma have a dream house,
and a dream car, and dream candy and a dream house and me and Barbie are gonna live with Ken
and Skipper and Malibu Barbie.
Id.
147

See, e.g., BONNER, supra note 65, at 8–9 (―I can really relate to Whoopi Goldberg‘s joke about wearing a towel
on her head, pretending it was her hair because I did that stuff, too.‖).
148
Padgett, supra note 33. In fact, ―Latino and African-American men . . . seem more often than white men to link
long hair with attractiveness for women of all ages.‖ Weitz, supra note 11, at 672.
149
Ieesha McKinzie, Hampton Business School Sticks by Requirement for “Conservative” Hairstyles, BLACK
COLLEGE WIRE, Mar. 27, 2006, available at http://www.blackcollegewire.org/news/060327_hampton-hair/.
150
See Tamara Dietrich, HU Policy on Hair Might Be Better with a Trim, DAILYPRESS.COM, Apr. 23, 2006,
available at http://articles.dailypress.com/2006-04-23/news/0604230074_1_black-heritage-hampton-universityblack-family (quoting the dean of Hampton‘s Business School).
151
For example, Sean Linder, a former student in the business program, described the policy as ―a way of making
African Americans assimilate to the mainstream standards [of] ‗what is professional and what is not.‘‖ McKinzie,
supra note 149. Linder, who was initially asked to sit in the back of the classroom when he did not comply with
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the policy is needed because a ―more clean-cut look can be an asset to almost any student
seeking advancement in the corporate world.‖152 He is not alone in his view that ―braids and
cornrows could set [a black applicant] back.‖153 For example, Chris Roy, a marketing student in
the program, argued,
Even though we [Blacks] made a lot of progress as far as social norms, I still think dreads
or a ‘fro will make it more difficult to be viewed in the same light as an applicant that fits
the mold . . . . Your hair has nothing to do with your intelligence, but there are
154
preconceptions that people may have about you.

Overall, the bias against natural hairstyles for black women is intense, so strong that
Huffington Post author Keli Goff questioned how well Michelle Obama would have been
received on the campaign trail if she had a natural hairstyle.155 She wrote:
Just two years ago an editor at a major fashion magazine labeled afros a fashion ―don‘t,‖
(though the fallout from the incident is said to have cost her job.) But while there may
have been fallout the reality is that most black women striving to succeed in the
mainstream workforce do feel compelled to go to great lengths not to wear our hair
natural, i.e. in all its fro glory. Instead we endure the inconvenient and often painful
process known as relaxing (or what we like to call “getting a perm.”) . . .
So I ask you to consider for a moment, how well do you think Michelle Obama
would have fared on the campaign trail had she been rocking an au-natural hairstyle, a la
the infamous New Yorker cover (and I don‘t mean the latest one.)156

Indeed, the biases against natural black hair, both conscious and unconscious, are so strong
and invisible that courts have routinely dismissed the claims of black women who have protested
bans against natural hairstyles without a hint of trying to understand why, as Caldwell asserted,
black women would risk losing their jobs as a result of disputes over their hair.157

Hampton Business School‘s hairstyle policy by wearing his hair in twists, opted to complete extra work and
assignments in order to make up missed seminars for classes he was not allowed to attend because of his violations
of the policy. Id. (quoting Linder as saying ―I noticed everyone back there [in the classroom] had ethnic
hairstyles‖).
152
See id.; see also Dietrich, supra note 150 (noting that Dean Credle said the policy is ―to help groom [the students]
for the button-down, clean-cut corporate world to which they [are] headed‖).
153
See McKinzie, supra note 149.
154
Id. Another commentator described his friend‘s argument in favor of Hampton‘s policy, stating, ―[My friend]
countered that the business world does not see either [tastefully styled braids or dreadlocks] as standard-issue
hairstyles. When in the business world, she added, you do as the business people do. That‟s how you get a job and
it‟s how you get ahead.‖ Allen Johnson, A Hair-Raising Debate, NEWS-RECORD.COM, Apr. 13, 2006,
http://blog.news-record.com/staff/outloud/archives/2006/04/a_hairraising_d.shtml (emphasis added).
155
Keli Goff, Michelle Obama: Wonder Woman, HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 11, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/keli-goff/michelle-obama-wonder-wom_b_173886.html?view=print.
156
Id. (emphasis added); see also Jenee Desmond-Harris, Why Michelle‟s Hair Matters, TIME, Sept. 7, 2009, at 55–
56 (discussing how the ―obsession‖ with Michelle Obama‘s hair has become ―a catalyst for a conversation . . .
[about] African-American women‘s status in terms of beauty, acceptance and power‖).
157
Caldwell, supra note 10, at 390.
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B. BROKE AND HARRIED

Just as the Afro is protected under Title VII as a hairstyle that supports the natural growth of
black hair, so, too, should natural hairstyles such as braids, locks, and twists be protected under
the statute. Plaintiffs‘ lawyers can prove how such bans on natural hairstyles for black women
constitute disparate treatment discrimination under Title VII in two ways.
First, lawyers can use the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas v. Green158
to prove that such requirements discriminate against black women by treating them less
favorably than white women. Under this framework, a plaintiff usually can prove discrimination
through three different steps. In the first step, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by proving the following four factors: (1) that she belonged to a minority group;
(2) that she was qualified for the position or was adequately performing her duties in that
position; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that she was treated less
favorably than others outside of her group or that there are circumstances that give rise to an
inference of discrimination.159 Once the plaintiff proves each of these factors, the court then
draws an inference of discrimination and moves to the second step, where the employer must
merely articulate a legitimate explanation for rejecting the plaintiff‘s applications.160 If the
employer satisfies this burden, the court then moves to the third step, where the plaintiff has to
prove that the employer‘s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination in order to win the
case.161 The plaintiff may prove pretext by demonstrating that the proffered reason had no basis
in fact, did not actually motivate the employer‘s challenged conduct, or was insufficient to
warrant the challenged conduct.162

158

411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (―The shifting
burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the ‗plaintiff [has] his day in court
despite the unavailability of direct evidence.‖‘ (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979))).
A number of scholars have argued that Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), will result in the treatment of
most Title VII intentional discrimination claims as mixed motive cases and have maintained that the McDonnell
Douglas framework is no longer viable. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert
Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549, 1566 (2005); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay on
the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case after Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa into a "Mixed Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71, 72–73 (2003); Michael J. Zimmer, The New
Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1891 (2004).
But see Matthew R. Scott & Russell D. Chapman, Much Ado About Nothing—Why Desert Palace Neither Murdered
McDonnell Douglas Nor Transformed All Employment Discrimination Cases to Mixed Motive, 36 ST. MARY‘S L.J.
395, 405 (2005) (―[N]othing in Desert Palace hints at the death or even wounding of McDonnell Douglas.‖). Many
courts, however, still apply the McDonnell Douglas framework in analyzing discrimination cases. See., e.g., Strate
v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc. 398 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005).
159
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992).
160
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803–04; see also Tex. Dep‘t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
254–56 (1981) (noting that the defendant‘s burden is only one of production, not persuasion).
161
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803–04; see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 143
(2000).
162
Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2003). Even upon proof of pretext, a jury may still ultimately
rule in favor of the defendant if it believes that a non-discriminatory factor was at play. See St. Mary‘s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (holding that a plaintiff who proves pretext in the third stage does not necessarily
win because the factfinders may still find that there was no discrimination). As Professor Martin Katz has
explained:
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In dress code cases, however, this framework for evaluating discrimination claims is slightly
modified—at least with respect to sex-based grooming discrimination cases, where this
appearance code discrimination law has largely developed.163 In these cases, courts
acknowledge employers‘ rights to have different appearance standards based on sex.164
In order to assert a valid disparate treatment claim based upon a grooming code under this
modified standard, a plaintiff first has to make out a prima facie case establishing that the
challenged employment action was either intentionally discriminatory—that it targeted her
gender in an unfair way, treated her less favorably, or was premised on a stereotype—or that the
different standards impose an unequal burden upon her group.165 ―An appearance standard that
imposes different but essentially equal burdens on men and women is not disparate treatment.‖166
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. However, in a
grooming code case with different requirements for different groups, an employer can justify its
requirements only by showing that they are bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQ).167 A
BFOQ is a qualification that is reasonably necessary to the normal operation or essence of an
employer‘s business.168 Unlike for sex, there is no BFOQ for race, so a plaintiff would win under
this modified standard simply by proving a prima facie case where race was involved.
In the intersectional race and gender claims based on natural hairstyle bans, any black
female plaintiff should be able to prove a prima facie of intentional discrimination. Assuming
that the plaintiff is qualified, or is meeting job expectations, and is like many black women who
have fallen prey to natural hairstyle bans through a refusal to hire or a decision to terminate, she
will easily be able to show that she was treated less favorably than others outside of her group.169
After all, bans on natural hairstyles simply do not have the same substantive meaning for black
and white women. Because of the unique curliness of black hair, black women are unable to
wear their hair down and in its natural state, unless it is weighed down by locks, twists, or braids.
The current law on dress codes and hair assumes ―non-Negro characteristics‖ of hair for black
women or rather presumes that only straight hair that hangs down is the most professional way
for all women to wear their hair. As it stands now, due to the structure of black women‘s hair
shafts and follicles, black women must artificially straighten their hair with a relaxer or hot comb
If the defendant‘s proffered reason is wrong, the factfinder can conclude either that the defendant
lied or that the defendant made a good faith mistake (a nondiscriminatory reason). Or if the
defendant lied, the factfinder can conclude that the lie was either a cover-up or a lie for a benign
reason (a second possible nondiscriminatory reason). Or, if the defendant engaged in a cover-up,
the factfinder can conclude that what was being covered up was either a discriminatory motivation
or a nondiscriminatory one (a third possible nondiscriminatory reason).
Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 172 (2007). ―The[se] presumptions
and shifting burdens are merely an aid—not ends in themselves.‖ Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 130
(3d Cir. 1985). The ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff at all times. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
163
See 110 CONG. REC. 2550 (1964) (expressly rejecting race as a BFOQ).
164
Jespersen v. Harrah‘s Operating Co. 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Frank v. United Airlines,
216 F.3d 845, 854 (9th Cir. 2000).
165
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1108–09; Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1980).
166
Frank, 216 F.3d at 854.
167
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1109.
168
See POST, supra note 4, at 17–18.
169
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577,
582 (6th Cir. 1992).
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just to get to the baseline for satisfying the workplace rules and policies for many employers, and
that baseline is straight hair that hangs down, hair that most white women, and very few black
women, naturally grow.170 Both of these processes—chemical relaxers and pressing from a hot
comb—are costly, time intensive, and painful,171 resulting in considerably less favorable
treatment of black women than white women under such codes.
After proof of the prima facie case, however, it is not clear which of the two burden-shifting
frameworks—the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework or the modified dress code one—
would actually apply to intersectional race and gender grooming discrimination claims by black
women. Because courts have never actually gone beyond the point of deciding that hairstyles
such as braids, locks, and twists are not immutable characteristics and thus not protected under
Title VII as race, no court has actually applied any burden-shifting framework to these types of
grooming cases. Nevertheless, the cases that highlight the protection of Afro hairstyles under
Title VII172 seem to suggest that courts would apply the modified grooming code framework that
is used in sex discrimination cases to such intersectional claims. After all, in those cases, once
courts identify and explain Afros as a racial characteristic, there is no more discussion or analysis
by the courts, simply a finding of discrimination. In that event, any black female plaintiff would
win her intersectional claim at this point, simply by proof of her prima facie claim.
Even if the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework, instead of the modified dress code
framework, applied in these intersectional cases, a black female plaintiff could still prevail on her
race and sex discrimination claim (depending upon the reason asserted by the defendant). A
plaintiff may prove pretext by demonstrating that the proffered reason is not true, did not actually
motivate the employer‘s challenged conduct, or was insufficient to warrant the challenged
conduct.173 For example, if the plaintiff‘s employer explained its actions simply by stating that it
did not know that such styles were the only ways for black women to wear their hair in its
natural state, a statement that would seem to disprove any intent to discriminate, the plaintiff‘s
lawyer could offer evidence to show (1) that the reason had no basis in fact because she
explained to her employer her reasons for wanting to wear her hair natural and the fact that her
hairstyle was one of only a few ways that she could wear her hair long and in its natural state, or
(2) that the employer was really motivated by a preference for white hair and hairstyles as
evidenced by his inconsistent application of his grooming requirements to Whites who did not
abide by regulations, for example, a white female employee who arrives at work with her hair
wet from washing and ungroomed. Moreover, it is not clear that an employer could even provide
such a reason as a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for its actions. After all, so long as
the employer understood that there are real differences in the textures and structures of black and
white hair, it would be improper to give him a pass simply because he did not take the time to
fully think through the implications of those differences. Such failure should not be sufficient to
warrant the challenged grooming restrictions.

170

Rosette & Dumas, supra note 7, at 411–16.
See infra notes 177–210 and accompanying text.
172
There are very few of these cases. See E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71-244, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 18 (June 10,
1971) (holding that while an employer‘s line of sight grooming policy was equally enforced, it adversely affected
black employees who naturally have a different texture hair from white employees); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual
Hosp. Ins., 538 F.2d 164, 168 (7th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that the plaintiff had a valid Title VII claim where she
alleged that her employer fired her because of her Afro hairstyle); see also Rogers v. Am. Airlines, 527 F. Supp 229,
232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (asserting that a code that prohibits ―the ‗Afro/bush‘ hairstyle might offend Title VII‖).
173
Johnson v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 866 (6th Cir. 2003).
171
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In addition to showing intentional discrimination under the burden-shifting frameworks
described above, plaintiffs‘ attorneys could try to prove discrimination with a proposal that
courts apply the undue burden test to black female plaintiffs‘ intersectional claims based on hair
grooming codes. Again, once the plaintiff established this undue or unequal burden on black
women as a result of the grooming requirements, she would automatically win her intersectional
claim because race, which is integral to her claim, can never be a BFOQ. Specifically, these
lawyers could offer evidence to show how the implicit demands for black women to straighten
their hair with a relaxer or hot comb impose an undue burden on them in terms of time, money,
and mental and physical health. Although courts have not applied the undue burden test to race
discrimination cases, applying the test only to gender discrimination cases such as Jespersen,
that omission is solely because courts have incorrectly assumed, as Caldwell stated, that black
women and white women have the same motivations for wearing hairstyles such as braids; in
other words, they have failed to acknowledge hair as a defining feature of race for Blacks.174 In
so doing, they have presumed that no black hairstyles outside of the Afro would support a
legitimate claim of interracial, disparate treatment within gender. Specifically, courts have
ignored the biological nature of black women‘s hair that makes it hard work for black women to
obtain and maintain straightened hair or that may motivate them to forego any hair straightening
process. When such biology is noted and considered, it becomes clear that the unwritten, raced
and gendered norms for hair by many employers place a significantly greater burden on black
women than white women. Hairstyles such as ―Afros, braids, twists, and dreadlocks are the
primary style choices that release Black women from the financial and physical burdens of hair
straightening.‖175
First, lawyers could offer evidence regarding the costs of hair straightening and maintenance
by black women. The financial costs alone of paying for repeated perms and touch-ups are
burdensome. To straighten a black woman‘s hair through a relaxer costs approximately $60 to
$300 for each full permanent or $40 to $100 dollars for each touch-up in between full relaxers,
with either full relaxers or touch-ups occurring every four to eight weeks or sooner.176 Recall
again that such actions only get black women to the baseline; styling or any other processes such
as coloring that women routinely engage in to do their hair must still occur. The end-result is a
―billion-dollar industry built on products and companies that promise to eliminate curls from
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textured ethnic hair.‖177 In fact, black women spend nearly fifty million dollars a year on
relaxers alone and spend an estimated three times more than white women on hair care.178
In addition to the financial costs of relaxers and other hair straighteners, lawyers also could
provide testimony and data regarding the burdens in time spent on straightening and maintaining
straightened hair at the beauty shop or at home. Maintaining relaxed hair can be a lengthy daily
task. For instance, in her article, „Oel My Hare Gaan Huistoe‟: Hair-Styling as Black Cultural
Practice, Zmitri Erasmus listed the seventeen individual steps that she took as a teenager to
maintain ―good hair‖ or straight hair, which together amounted to several hours in a day.179
Furthermore, although purchasing a hot comb is inexpensive, straightening black hair with a hot
comb requires an exorbitant amount of time, often necessitating two to three hours of work every
few days, just for straightening without any styling. Additionally, the time that many black
women spend worrying about rain, pools, or other forms of water that may counteract the effects
of any applied relaxer or hot pressing is further limiting.180 As Lanita Jacobs-Huey, author of
From the Kitchen to the Parlor: Language and Becoming in African-American Women‟s Hair
Care, has asserted, ―[i]f you can‘t dance ‗cause you‘re worried about sweating out your hair,
can‘t swim . . . can‘t go out in the rain, life is limiting.‖181
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Furthermore, lawyers could offer a plethora of evidence regarding the physical harm caused
by the chemicals from relaxers. Even if one could argue that the costs in money and time (at
least in the initial stages) for black women in wearing natural hair are the same as those in
obtaining and maintaining artificially straightened hair,182 the burdens of employer bans on
braids, locks, and twists extend beyond time and money. One especially burdensome cost for
black women is the damage to the health of their hair and scalp.183 Relaxers cause significant
damage to black women‘s hair over time, resulting in dryness that turns into breakage and hair
loss.184 Even without relaxers, black hair is dryer than white hair. Sebum is the oily, waxy
substance that lubricates the hair, working its way from the hair shaft.185 If a person‘s hair is
straight, the sebum flows down easily, wetting the hair, but if the hair is curly, the sebum has to
work its way around each twist and curl, often never reaching the ends of each individual hair.186
Relaxers make the dryness even worse because they alter the protective shingles and make the
hair shaft dryer.187
Additionally, relaxers can result in great damage to the scalp, including chemical scalp burns
that may require the attention of dermatologists.188 The chemicals used in relaxers are extremely
strong. For example, lye or sodium hydroxide, which is often a main ingredient in relaxers, is
the same chemical that people use to strip paint or to make soap.189 Similarly, no-lye relaxers
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washbasin.
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contain calcium hydroxide, which is used to treat water and sewage; they also include guanidine
carbonate, which, among other things, is used for hair removal.190 A black female journalist
described the often painful process of relaxing:
For those of you unfamiliar with the complexities of black hair care, straightening is a
process in which a stylist sections your hair and applies a cream that starts out cool but
becomes unbearably hot. The cream contains sodium hydroxide, commonly found in
drain and oven cleaners, and so corrosive that stylists have to use rubber gloves. When
you absolutely can‘t stand the heat anymore, the stylist rinses it out. Straight hair, and
sometimes scabs, result. The longer the cream stays in, the more you burn, but the
straighter your hair gets; walk into a black salon and the most common thing you‘ll see is
a woman gripping the armrests of a chair to manage her pain.191

According to the Environmental Working Group, chemical relaxers, which have a pH of
approximately twelve—similar to household ammonia—are one of the most caustic products on
the market. Along with hair dyes, chemical relaxers receive the most complaints from customers
for damage.192 In fact, black women are often discouraged from using relaxers when they are
pregnant.193 Perhaps the strongest evidence of the damage that is caused to black women‘s hair
through relaxers is the length and rapidity at which black women‘s hair grows when it is kept in
its natural structure and texture.194
Indeed, a number of black hairdressers have even begun to direct their customers away from
traditional relaxers to plant-based products.195 Although there is a growing movement among
black female consumers to push manufacturers to produce these types of ―gentle‖ relaxers, such
relaxers still contain strong chemicals and come with their own set of drawbacks. The actual
product itself is three times the costs of the traditional relaxer product, making the financial
burden of implicit requirements for straightened hair even higher.196 Likewise, processes such as
thermal reconditioning (TR) are not only significantly more expensive and time-consuming, but
also have been reported to cause severe damage and hair loss for some women.197 TR
straightens hair by the application of a chemical, the ironing of the hair piece by piece, a rinse,
and a blow dry. But it also takes more than four hours, if uninterrupted, and costs $800 for each
treatment.198 In sum, even the less caustic straightening chemicals place an undue burden on
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black women, because they are more time-consuming and more expensive than ordinary
relaxers.
Furthermore, attorneys could present testimony and data to show that restrictions on natural
hairstyles for black women arguably impact the physical health of black women. Research
shows that many black women avoid exercise because the sweat from working out may destroy
their hairstyles.199 Researchers at Wake Forest University School of Medicine found that one
third of black women do not exercise or exercise less than they would like due to the
complications of hair care.200 Why the resistance to working out? Perspiration from exercise
can make the roots of hair wet, reverting black women‘s hair back to its tightly coiled and coarse
structure and texture.201 Dr. Amy J. McMichael, Associate Professor of Dermatology, explained:
Many African American women with coarser hair use either heat straighteners or
chemical products to straighten their hair. Depending on how coarse or fragile their hair
is, they can‘t just wash their hair after exercise without having to go through the whole
process again, and that can take hours. Over-washing fragile hair can make it break off
202
easily.

The effects of lack of exercise for black women are especially threatening to black women, as
seventy-seven percent of them are overweight, placing black women at higher risk for
hypertension, diabetes, and other serious illnesses.203
In addition to the undue burden imposed by implicit demands made on black women for
relaxed hair, lawyers could show that the alternative presented by American Airlines in Rogers—
the use of a ―hair piece‖—can carry significant consequences for the health of black women‘s
scalp and hair and is enormously expensive. In Rogers, the health consequence for the plaintiff
was severe headaches.204 For many black women, however, wearing weaves or similar
hairpieces can cause great damage to their scalp. Because of the way in which weaves are
generally either sewn into or glued onto the scalp, they suffocate the scalp, essentially causing
the hair to die underneath the artificial extension.205 Additionally, hair weaves can be expensive;
in fact, black men and women ―spend $225 million annually on hair weaving services and
products.‖206 As the movie Good Hair revealed, even black women who are on limited budgets,
such as school teachers, are investing $1000 for just one weave, which may last two or three
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months.207 Some weaves cost as much as $5000, and at least one black woman in the film spent
approximately $18,000 a year on weaves.208
Finally, lawyers could offer testimony showing that the burden of these implicit demands is
bad for black women‘s psychological health. The inescapable message that is sent to black
women through the reinforcement of raced and gendered norms that ―assume non-Negro
characteristics‖ is that their hair is not good enough and not presentable in its natural state. In
her article A Hair Piece, Caldwell vividly speaks of the negative psychological consequences
that have flowed and can continue to flow from black women‘s attempts to fit their hair within a
white female beauty norm.209 In detailing her desires about her relationship with her hair, she
wrote:
I want to know my hair again, the way I knew it before I knew Sambo and Dick,
Buckwheat and Jane, Prissy and Miz Scarlett. Before I knew that my hair could be
wrong—the wrong color, the wrong texture, the wrong amount of curl or straight. Before
hot combs and thick grease and smelly-burning lye, all guaranteed to transform me, to
silken the coarse, resistant wool that represents me. I want to know once more the time
before I denatured, denuded, denigrated, and denied my hair and me, before I knew
enough to worry about edges and kitchens and burrows and knots, when I was still a
friend of water—the rain‘s dancing drops of water, a swimming hole‘s splashing water, a
hot, muggy day‘s misty invisible water, my own salty, sweaty perspiring water.210

In sum, bans on natural hairstyles for black women result in disparate treatment
discrimination not only because they result in less favorable treatment of black women at the
intersection of race and gender but also because they impose an undue burden on black‘s
women‘s finances, time, and health, both psychologically and physically.
C. IT'S NO LYE!: THE EFFECTS ARE DISPARATE

At the very least, a black female plaintiff should be able to establish a traditional
disparate impact claim under Title VII based on an employer ban of braided, locked, and twisted
hairstyles. To establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff must
show that a specific employment practice produced an adverse effect on the basis of a protected
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status, such as race.211 A plaintiff generally can prove such causation by comparing the rates of
majority and minority employees or applicants who are affected by the rule and then showing
that the disparity is statistically significant or violates the four-fifths rule.212 In applying disparate
impact theory, ―statistical significance establishes that the challenged practice likely caused the
disparity, and the four-fifths rule establishes that the disparity is large enough to matter.‖213
Under the four-fifths rule, a disparity is actionable when one group‘s pass (non-impacted) rate is
less than four-fifths (eighty percent) of another group‘s pass (non-impacted) rate.214 ―Under
statistical significance tests, a disparity is actionable when we can be confident at a specified
level—generally ninety-five percent—that the observed disparity is not due to random
chance.‖215
The Supreme Court has rejected a ―rigid mathematical formula‖ for disparate impact,
asserting simply that statistical disparities must be ―sufficiently substantial‖ that they give rise to
an inference of causation.216 Once a plaintiff establishes a ―sufficiently substantial‖ disparity, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the plaintiff‘s statistics or to show that the challenged
practice is ―job related‖ and consistent with ―business necessity.‖217 If the employer succeeds,
the plaintiff then must show that other tests or selection processes would serve the employer‘s
interest without creating the undesirable discriminatory effect.218 This standard is difficult to
meet, though, because ―[f]actors such as the cost or other burdens of proposed alternative
selection devices are relevant in determining whether [the alternatives] would be equally as
effective as the challenged practice in serving the employer‘s legitimate business goals.‖ 219
In establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact, a plaintiff first must identify a
specific employment practice to be challenged, and then, through relevant statistical analysis,
must prove that the challenged practice has an adverse impact on a protected group.220 In
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making these comparisons, a plaintiff must demonstrate disparate impact with respect to the pool
of qualified persons in the relevant labor market for the given position.221
For the purposes of this Essay, imagine that we are looking at one work environment, and
imagine that that employer is a hypothetical company called Vitatech in Atlanta, Georgia with
the following demographics: 200 employees, of whom 34% are white men (68), 37% are white
women (74), 14% are black men (28), and 15% are black women (30). At Vitatech, ninety-seven
percent of the women who identify as black in the workplace have tightly coiled and kinky hair,
while the remaining three percent—which is one black woman—have hair that hangs in big
corkscrew curls that tend to hang down, rather than grow up. Approximately sixty-three percent
of the black women, a total of nineteen, relax their hair, including the one black woman with
corkscrew curls.222 The remaining thirty-seven percent, eleven total, wear their hair in either
short Afros (1), braids (7), locks (2), or twists (1)—what they refer to as ―natural hairstyles.‖
Ninety-seven percent of the women who identify as white have straight hair, while the remaining
three percent have wavy hair; none have tightly coiled and kinky hair (or pink, purple, or green
hair). Vitatech decides that it wants its employees to look their ―personal best‖ in the workplace
and decides to impose a grooming code that bans ―unusual,‖ ―unprofessional,‖ or ―extreme‖
hairstyles.223 In explaining its policy, Vitatech identifies mohawks; strange-colored hair, such as
pink, green, or purple hair; braids; locks; and twists as examples of prohibited ―extreme,‖
―unprofessional,‖ or ―unusual‖ hairstyles.
Based on the facts above, a black female plaintiff who challenged the employer‘s practice of
banning braids, locks, and twists could show that black women are significantly more affected in
a negative way by the ban than white women, regardless of whether one narrows or broadens the
relevant comparison groups. First, if one defines the group broadly by classifying the black and
white female groups according to biological make-up of hair—those for whom braids, locks, and
twists are the only way for them to wear their hair hanging down and long in its natural texture
and structure (in other words, those who wear natural hairstyles as well as those who may desire
to wear natural hairstyles for biological reasons but are discouraged from doing so because of the
implicit demands to wear straightened hair), then the group of negatively affected black women
includes twenty-nine out of thirty women or 96.7%, and the group of negatively affected white
women includes zero out of seventy-four women or 0%. In other words, nearly all black women,
96.7%, versus no white women would be negatively impacted by the policy, which is both a
statistically significant difference (not the result of mere chance) and a difference that fails the
four-fifths test, with a non-impacted rate of 3.3% for black women and a non-impacted rate of
100% for white women.
Even if one were to define the comparison groups more narrowly, comparing only those
black women who currently have the banned natural hairstyles with those white women who
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currently have the banned natural hairstyles—the specific employment practice in question, then
the group of negatively affected black women includes eleven out of thirty (excluding the one
black women with a short Afro) or 36.7%, and the group of negatively affected white women
again includes zero out of seventy-four or 0%. In other words, more than one-third of black
women versus no white women would be negatively impacted by the policy, which is both a
statistically significant difference (not the result of mere chance) and a difference that fails the
four-fifths test, with a non-impacted rate of 63.3% for black women and a non-impacted rate of
100% for white women.224
Additionally, were one to focus solely on the negative consequences of financial and
temporal costs in relaxing and maintaining straightened hair, a black female plaintiff could show
a disparate impact there as well. By definition, there would always be a disparate impact.
Although many women spend significant amounts of money and time on their hair, black women
would always be spending more than white women because one would always have to add to
their styling, coloring, and other costs the very costs of getting to the baseline—of straightening
and then maintaining that straightened hair.
Furthermore, no claims of business necessity could justify such disparate impacts. Although
employers certainly have the right to regulate employee appearance in presenting a preferred
business image, they do not have a right to do so in a racially discriminatory way. Additionally,
courts have consistently held that customer discrimination—customer desire—is not an
acceptable reason to discriminate on the basis of race.225
Although the need to keep hair from falling in food is a reason that would satisfy the business
necessity defense, it factually would not pass muster in the case of employer bans on braids,
locks, and twists. First, the employer could require the employees to wear hair nets, just as they
currently do for white employees, whose hair nonetheless drops into food at times. Moreover,
braided, locked, or twisted hair is less likely than relaxed hair to fall into food. In fact, the dead
hair that falls from people‘s heads is not likely to fall anywhere at all when a black woman is
wearing braids, locks, and twists because the hair falls into the braid, lock or twist. Indeed, that
is exactly the process by which locks form. Relaxed hair, on the other hand, is much more likely
to break than natural hair because its natural structure and texture have been weakened by the
chemical process. Finally, even those reasons which have been deemed legitimate reasons in
other instances would fail as legitimate in this hypothetical (and would also be unlikely to be
deemed reasonably necessary to achieve an important business objective or to be considered a
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minimum qualification to perform the job successfully). For example, were an employer to
claim that natural hairstyles were banned because they do not look good, that employer would
encounter difficulty in showing that such a reason is not racially tinged, especially if the
employer views relaxed hair as suitable. After all, it is a perversion to assert that black women‘s
hair is not presentable in its natural structure and texture and that black women‘s hair is only
presentable when it is physically altered to look like white women‘s hair. Furthermore, in many
of the cases or anecdotes involving black women who have suffered because of employer bans
on black-female natural hairstyles, the employers concede that the women‘s hairstyles are wellgroomed; the employers simply view them as unpresentable.
Overall, in a world where our gender norms establish long, flowing hair as the normative
ideal for women, black women must have a choice that does not require them to change the
structure and texture of their hair. The key factor to avoiding intersectional racial and genderbased discrimination through hair in employer dress codes is to ensure that black women have
the same opportunities to wear their hair in its natural state as white women and in a way that fits
the gendered expectations that are upheld by the law. That action must include the provision of
choices that do not automatically prevent black women from wearing their hair long in both its
natural structure and texture, even though many black women may ultimately choose to relax
their hair. Again, think back to the imaginary white female plaintiff in the Introduction. She was
subject to the same dress code restrictions as all other women, regardless of race, but she faced
discrimination based on race because the choices presented to her for wearing her hair—one of
many factors that have been used in determining racial identity—did not fit the structure and
texture of her hair.226
V. HAIR RAISING
Many employers express shock that black women who refuse to unbraid their hair take
such a strong stance, one that could cost them their jobs, in defense of a hairstyle.
–Paulette Caldwell, A Hair Piece227

The termination of Mablean Ephriam, formerly of Divorce Court on Fox Network, is
particularly illustrative of how the raced and gendered norms for women‘s hair—that of straight
hair that hangs down—detrimentally affect black women within the workplace. Judge Mablean,
a black woman, was fired from her successful television show after seven years in part because
of her unwillingness to agree to the network‘s demand for her to cover her hair with a wig.228
Her experience not only demonstrates the resistance to and marginalization of any hairstyle
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outside of the unspoken raced and gendered hair norms, but also reveals the temporal, financial,
and health costs to black women by the perpetuation and reinforcement of those norms.
Unlike the black female plaintiffs in cases such as Rogers, Judge Mablean was willing to
perm or straighten her hair, but Fox Network reportedly objected to her plan on the ground that it
would be too ―time consuming.‖229 As this Essay has detailed, the process of straightening and
maintaining black women‘s hair can be long and arduous as well as expensive. Judge Mablean
explained these difficulties herself in a press conference about her termination:
W]hy is my hair an issue[?] Why, I ask?
Because of my ethnicity–African American, Black, Negro, whatever term you prefer
to use. Because of my genetics (short, curly, hair) which requires the use of chemicals
and/or a hot pressing comb to straighten and curlers to style. It cannot be styled by a
wash, blow dry and set.230

In fact, Fox Network wanted the judge to continue wearing the wig that she had begun to
wear only after she had damaged and lost her own hair through ―a misapplication of a chemical
[straightening] process.‖231 The judge explained the following about the events that forced her
toward the wig that the network wanted her to continue to use. She stated:
Due to a misapplication of a chemical process, I lost a substantial amount of hair in
season six. Out of my desire to maintain continuity and the image I had created (for the
last five years), I elected to wear a wig last year for continuity. Had Fox asked me to
maintain a short hairstyle for continuity and for image, it would have been a different
issue. But they are saying I must continue to wear the wig because that would expedite
the hair styling process. However, my hair has now grown.232

What was surprising about Fox‘s reaction to Judge Mablean‘s plan was that she had never
imposed the burdens of her hair straightening and styling on the network, choosing instead to
internalize the costs on her time and money. Judge Mablean was willing to absorb the uneven
application of her employer‘s grooming desires by first straightening her hair, a process that is
more burdensome in time and money than for white women. She described how she avoided
imposing any ―additional‖ costs or time to the network, stating:
The fact that it takes more time to style my hair than my Caucasian sisters, in general,
should not be an issue. What is more interesting about this demand is that I never caused
time to be an issue because of my hair. I have been conscious and aware of the fact that
it does take more time to style my hair. Therefore, I set my call time earlier than any of
the other staff to assure that I was ready in time for the schedule. More importantly, I had
the chemical work done off set at my expense. The only thing that had to be done on the
233
set was the pressing and styling. It has worked for seven years.

229

Kersey, supra note 228.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
231
Id.
232
Id.
233
E-mail from Christine Jones, supra note 228.
230

Page 42 of 47

Why all the fuss about Judge Mablean‘s hair then? The fuss relates to one of the
complexities of discrimination in our post-Civil Rights era, where palatable outsiders are now
included in the workplace but only so long as they meet unwritten demands to cover.234 Judge
Mablean failed to satisfy those demands by insisting that her hair—her race—be visible, rather
than invisible. Although Judge Mablean had managed to make her differences from the norm
invisible for seven years by absorbing the costs in time and money on her own, she could no
longer shelter her employer from such difference once the employer was exposed to it through
the loss of her hair and her use of a wig. Once exposed, there was no going back for Judge
Mablean. As with many black women, Judge Mablean had an employer that required her to
downplay her disfavored identity—her status as a black woman and thus her hair.235 Once the
process of relaxing hair was revealed as an occasionally unreliable method for covering or for
achieving a look ―identical‖ to white women, her employer could no longer accept that method
for downplaying difference, even if Judge Mablean continued in her efforts to make such actions
invisible. The wig, with its proven reliability, became the only choice for satisfying the chosen
workplace norms. Like so many employers, and even courts such as that in Rogers, Fox
Network would have rather had Judge Mablean ―cover‖ her own hair rather than deal with the
complexities and realities of black hair.
More so, underlying Judge Mablean‘s termination was a general resistance to factors that
have been determined to be outside of the norm, without any acknowledgment or recognition
that that particular norm for women‘s hair is both raced and gendered—that is, specifically based
on white women. As one commentator noted, ―society is uncomfortable with ethnic hair, and it is
uncomfortable about race.‖236 Indeed, we see such resistance in other cases such as Hollins v.
Atlantic Co., where the employer essentially forced its black female employees to obtain
approval for every shift in any hairstyle while not imposing any such requirement on white
women.237 In Hollins, Eunice Hollins sued her employer for race discrimination based upon the
unequal application of its grooming policy to her.238 The company‘s policy read in relevant part:
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Women should have a neat and well groomed hair style. Rollers and other hair setting
aids are not permitted. For safety, women may be required to have their hair tied
back. . . .
When it comes to your appearance as part of our Company, there are certain
standards important to our operation which you must follow. We don‘t ask just some of
our people to follow these standards, but that everyone follow them.239

The policing of Hollins‘s hair began on August 17, 1994, when Hollins arrived at work with her
hair styled in ―finger waves.‖240 One of her supervisors informed Hollins that her hairstyle was
unacceptable, later testifying that, although her hair was neat and well groomed, it was ―too
different‖ and ―eye-catching.‖241 Soon thereafter, Hollins received instruction to seek advance
approval for her hairstyles by presenting pictures of any styles that she wished to try to a
supervisor.242 Although approving a few hairstyles, her supervisors disapproved of many,
including one hairstyle ―with her hair pulled back in a ‗ponytail‘‖ even though ―[f]ive white
women on her shift working under the same supervisors wore the same style on many
occasions.‖243 Hollins‘s supervisors even chastised her when she wore previously approved
hairstyles.244 In fact, while noting that Hollins‘s neat and well groomed hairstyle ―caught his
attention because he was aware of [her] civil rights claims,‖ one supervisor testified that he and
other supervisors ―agreed that the ‗grooming standards are such that an [employee‘s] hair should
not in itself call attention to [the employee].‘‖245
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court‘s grant of summary judgment for the
employer,246 highlighting ―that a separate ‗calls attention‘ grooming prohibition that [was] not
mentioned in Atlantic‘s policy was formulated and applied specifically to Hollins‖ and that there
was evidence from which a jury could conclude that white women with ―identical hairstyles . . .
received different treatment.‖247 Although Hollins was more successful in her Title VII claim
than plaintiffs in cases such as Rogers, her case, as well as the experience of Judge Mablean,
highlight important factors regarding how white and gendered norms about the appearance of
women‘s hair affect and determine the reception of black women‘s natural hairstyles in the
workplace. In particular, they expose how the unwritten norms about acceptable women‘s hair
and assumptions about the relative ease with which black women can satisfy these norms set up
natural hairstyles such as braids to be perceived as ―eye-catching‖ or ―too different‖ within the
workplace. Moreover, they reveal an underlying distrust of black women‘s ability to look
professional. In this sense, black women are treated much like the female employees in Carroll
v. Talman Federal Savings and Loan Ass‟n of Chicago, where the employer required women to
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wear a uniform while giving men the freedom to pick their own work clothes within the bounds
of its grooming policy.248 There, the employer explained its policy, noting:
[D]ress competition among women is reduced and they do not have to be concerned
about wearing something that is appropriate business attire because the career ensemble
is acceptable. (D)ress competition exists among women employees on glamour days
(b)ut in the case of men employees there is little difficulty getting them to adhere to the
dress and grooming code requirements. And there is little dress competition among male
employees . . . .249

Counsel for the employer further described the business‘s reason for the difference in how
men and women were treated, stating:
[T]he selection of attire, of clothing on the part of women is not a matter of business
judgment. It is a matter of taste, a matter of what the other women are wearing, what
fashion is currently. When we get into that realm . . . problems develop. Somehow, the
women who have excellent business judgment somehow follow the fashion, and the slitskirt fashion which is currently prevalent . . . . They tend to follow those (fashions) and
they don‘t seem to equate that with a matter of business judgment.250

The Seventh Circuit held that the company discriminated against women based on ―offensive
stereotypes prohibited by Title VII,‖ explaining that the different sex-based rules suggested ―that
women cannot be expected to exercise good judgment in choosing business apparel, whereas
men can.‖251 In many ways, cases such as Hollins and Rogers reveal a similar lack of trust in
black women‘s judgment, suggesting that, without the appropriate guidance, black women would
not present themselves in acceptable ways or, in some cases, that the natural features of black
women are simply unpresentable.
CONCLUSION
In her hit song from 2006, ―I Am Not My Hair,‖ singer India Arie described her lifelong
trials and tribulations with her hair, describing her move from a press and curl to a Jheri curl252 to
a relaxer to locks and then to a shaved head as well as lamenting the difficulties of obtaining a
corporate job with natural hairstyles, such as locks.253 She also proclaimed this refrain
repeatedly:
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I am not my hair
I am not this skin
I am not your ex-pec-tations no no (hey)
I am not my hair
I am not this skin
I am a soul that lives within254

Despite Arie‘s words, although hair does not represent a person‘s personality or dignity, it,
along with skin color, is often a factor used to determine one‘s racial identity in this country.255
For Arie, her declaration about her hair was a celebration of what she saw as her authentic self.
Although many black women relax their hair and prefer to do so, many other black women such
as Rogers are prevented from being their authentic selves through natural hairstyles because of
the unspoken and unwritten white and gendered norms that define black hair as unacceptable
within the workplace.
This Essay has exposed the manner in which black women are discriminated against at the
intersection of race and gender through the enforcement and legal recognition of employer dress
codes that ban natural hairstyles worn by black women. Caught in a society that identifies long,
flowing hair as the normative ideal for women and has antidiscrimination laws that reinforce that
ideal, black women find themselves with very limited choices for their hair—that is, compared to
white women. Black women are even more limited than white women in the extent to which
they can wear their hair as it just grows naturally out of their head, without any styling.
Although white women generally could, for instance, grow their straight hair out to their
shoulders, black women with Afros are not permitted under many employer dress codes to grow
their natural hair out equally as long. Black women have no real choices under many employer
grooming codes if they want to wear their hair long and hanging down in its natural state.
Unlike the hair of most white women, which grows down as it grows long, black women‘s
natural hair grows up into an Afro as it lengthens, unless straightened with a relaxer or hot comb

Age eight I got a Jheri curl
Thirteen then I got a relaxer
I was a source of so much laughter
Fifteen when it all broke off
Eighteen when I went all natural . . . .
‘97 dreadlocks all gone
Id.
In describing job difficulties with natural hairstyles, Akon, with whom Arie performed the song, wrote:
Then I hit by the barber shop (real quick)
Had the mini little (twist) and it drove them crazy (drove ‗em crazy)
And then I couldn‘t get (no job)
Cause corporate wasn‘t hiring (no dreadlocks) (oh no) . . .
Hate to say it but it (seems so flaw)
Success didn‘t come ‗til I (cut it all off) (uh huh)
Id.
254

Id.
See supra notes 112–117 and accompanying text; see supra Part II.B (describing cases where an Afro style is
acknowledged as a racial characteristic)
255

Page 46 of 47

or weighed down by braids, locks, or twists. Of course, black women who want to keep their
hair natural could all just wear their hair in short Afros, but such a restriction by the law
impinges on their freedom in a way that the law does not for similarly situated white women.
Recall, again, the imaginary white female plaintiff in this Essay‘s introductory hypothetical. No
court would find such a code to be non-discriminatory. Providing black women with only two
choices for their hair—either relaxed hair or a short Afro—similarly should not be condoned.
Courts have rejected employer restrictions on Afro hairstyles as discriminatory,256 reasoning
that such restrictions measure Blacks ―against a standard that assumes non-Negro hair
characteristics.‖257 For the same reason, current antidiscrimination law must be modified to
recognize black women‘s natural hairstyles, such as braids, locks, and twists, as black-female
equivalents to Afros. As it is, the law is unfairly based upon an assumption that black women‘s
hair structure and texture are the same as those of white women or, worse, an assumption that it
is reasonable for an employer to make implicit demands on black women to relax or straighten
their hair—in other words, to place requirements on black women to change the physical
structure and texture of their hair.258 Such implicit requirements are no more acceptable than
implicit requirements to change nose width or skin color. Additionally, the law cannot continue
to ignore the biological nature of black women‘s hair in a way that places an undue burden on
black women with respect to their finances, hair and scalp health, physical health, and mental
health.
The issues regarding black women‘s natural hairstyles are primed and ready for reevaluation. These concerns about hair and race will not go away, but instead will become even
more important as more and more black women are transforming from relaxed hair to natural
hair.259 It is time for the law to apply in a way that makes ―good hair‖ days possible for all
women, regardless of their natural hair structure and texture.
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